There is a strong fear that Taliban is likely to return to power and would roll back everything the US did since its Operation Enduring Freedom.
The presidential announcements since President Barack Obama’s declaration of a “drawdown strategy” have clearly built apprehensions in the minds of the local Afghan populace in particular and the rest of the world in general about the future of Afghanistan. Most of the debates have centred on security, governance and economy. The peace and stability in Afghanistan remain highly uncertain all the time, whether the US troops remain or leave. Afghanistan has had an unsatisfactory record of governance, ravaged by rampant corruption and marked by near to nil performance. Less said the better regarding Afghanistan’s economy—economic growth will always depend on the security environment and overall governance performance. The growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) of Afghanistan will very much depend on peace and stability.
President Joe Biden announcing the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, said, “It’s time for American troops to come home.” “It’s time to end the forever war,” he said. In coordination, NATO partners will also be withdrawing forces from Afghanistan. Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “We went into Afghanistan together, we have adjusted our posture together, and we are united in leaving together.” The case of US withdrawal from Afghanistan was a foregone conclusion, but the specifics and time of such an announcement were a matter of debate. The debate seems closed now, with the formal announcement by President Joe Biden that all US forces will be withdrawn by 11 September, marking the end of 20 years of US involvement in Afghanistan, that came as a response to the 9/11 attacks at the World Trade Centre.
The George W. Bush administration had launched Operation Enduring Freedom, with the fundamental objective of hunting down the Al Qaeda leadership that masterminded the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan that supported and provided safe havens to Al Qaeda was also overthrown in the process, heralding a new era of US involvement in Afghanistan. What started as a military mission morphed into a long-term and broad-based nation-building exercise, with the United States orchestrating the Bonn negotiations, leading to the foundation of the Afghan government post Taliban. The civilian and military resources that the United States has invested in Afghanistan, along with its Nato allies and other like-minded partners determined the reconstruction of Afghanistan and there is no denying that much has changed in how Kabul interacts with the outside world. However, the other undeniable fact is that the Taliban, right under the noses of the US military and intelligence, was able to recoup and re-emerge as a force to reckon with, in the security and political dynamics of Afghanistan.
In the American policymaking and strategic community, the distraction of resources and attention to the Iraq War starting in 2003 have been largely blamed for the diminishing returns in Afghanistan. Fighting a home-grown group like the Taliban with sway over large parts of Afghanistan’s territory and the Afghan population was always going to be an uphill battle. Taliban quite effectively portrayed the US military and the US supported Afghan government as the foreign elements in their propaganda. The US government seems to have tried all the arrows in their quiver. These include a huge military presence after the surge ordered by the Obama administration to building the Afghan Security Forces, to the “wining hearts and minds” counterinsurgency approach, supporting the formal structures of the Afghan government under Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. Moreover, the American government has tried, without much success, to pressurise Pakistan to carry out more effective counter-terror measures to prodding regional countries to shoulder the burden and finally to signing a peace agreement with the Taliban without the Afghan government.
This was in many ways seen as a blatant disregard of the calls for an “Afghan owned, Afghan led and Afghan controlled” peace process and a clear signal of the Trump administration’s urgency to withdraw completely from Afghanistan, without clear commitments from the Taliban. While the US-Taliban peace agreement paved way for the intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, it did not clear the inherent contradictions and differences that marred any understanding including the release of Taliban prisoners and the growing violence between the Taliban and Afghan forces. Despite calls for a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan before the end of Trump’s presidency, the “forever” war was, as expected, bequeathed to President Biden.
While serving as the Vice President to President Obama, Biden made known his preference for a leaner counter-terrorism focused presence of US forces. When the Biden administration assumed office and took over the review of US policy towards Afghanistan, appeals came from Afghan officials to reconsider the terms of engagement with the Taliban. However, with the public announcement of a definite timeline of withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan, which will coordinate and calibrate with its NATO partners, a new phase of uncertainty overlooks the future of Afghanistan. Clearly, the Taliban is emboldened to negotiate with the American government as well as the Afghan government from a position of strength, and will most probably be in a position to create more leverages for itself in the evolving politico-security environment in Afghanistan. As the Taliban in its new form, envisions and shapes its role in the future of Afghanistan, what will be the implications for its terms of engagement with the rest of the world, and more particularly with regional players, including India? What will this mean for the institutions and establishments that have evolved in Afghanistan in the last two decades? How will this impact the role of other prominent stakeholders including Pakistan, and what will be its implications for India? These are the minefield of challenges, in which India has to recalibrate its engagement with Afghanistan. As such, India’s new foreign policy playbook in Afghanistan needs to adopt more adroitness and dexterity.
Apprehensions will continue on the future of Afghanistan, and more importantly, if the modest gains made in the last two decades on democracy and women’s rights will go in vain. There is a strong fear that Taliban is likely to return to power and would roll back everything the US did since its Operation Enduring Freedom. India will have to evolve a strategy to deal with the foreseeable challenges in the region.
Arvind Kumar is a Professor of American Studies and is also the Chairman of the Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies at School of International Studies, JNU. Monish Tourangbam teaches Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Manipal.