NEW DELHI: It has been over 100 hours since militants from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) hijacked the Jaffar Express in Balochistan. Still, Pakistan’s elite security forces are without answers. Islamabad’s Special Services Group (SSG), domestically celebrated as crack commandos, spectacularly failed to mount even a basic rescue operation, leaving over 200 hostages—including its own military and intelligence personnel—at the mercy of insurgents.
Instead of decisive action, Pakistan’s military pumped resources into the infamous Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) to managing perceptions, concealing the true scale of human losses and spinning a fictional narrative of triumph.
That narrative has now been brutally shattered: On Saturday morning, the BLA announced that they had escaped with 214 hostages—all of whom they executed since the 48-hour “deadline” to exchange said captives for Baloch political prisoners lapsed.
The military’s inability to rescue hostages or even safeguard its personnel points an unwavering finger toward deeper institutional weaknesses. Security experts say that the BLA operation’s sheer scale, coordination, and precision clearly indicate a massive intelligence failure within Pakistan’s much-vaunted security agencies.
The Jaffar Express route, traversing the Bolan Pass, has long been a known strategic faultline, frequently targeted by Baloch insurgents through bombings and ambushes. A train journey through this volatile corridor should have been subject to maximum intelligence surveillance, especially given Pakistan’s self-projected global image of possessing near-omniscient security oversight.
The fact that Pakistani agencies failed catastrophically in detecting such meticulous preparations exposes systemic failures that question the effectiveness and credibility of Islamabad’s intelligence apparatus.
OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS
Despite failure on the detection front, Islamabad still had time to save the lives of the hostages. Rescue operation and negotiation were both on the table.
Sadly, it is true that a leopard cannot change its spots.
The route of negotiation, as always took the backseat as the military tried to overcompensate for its failures and save face.
In its desperation to prove its mettle, Pakistan’s military prematurely claimed operational victory, with DG ISPR Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry confidently asserting that all militants had been neutralised swiftly and hostages rescued unharmed in the final phase.
However, ground reports from eyewitnesses, international media, and even internal Pakistani sources have dismantled this hastily-curated facade.
Survivors detailed how militants methodically segregated civilians from military personnel, holding more than 200 Pakistani soldiers as “prisoners of war.”
The BLA’s chilling announcement of systematically executing these hostages revealed Pakistan’s catastrophic operational failure. Then there was the quick influx of military coffins to Quetta’s hospitals, numbering over 100—and potentially up to 200 according to local sources. That grim scenario showed the anticipation of casualties by Pakistan’s military leadership, despite ISPR’s insistence on minimal losses.
Pakistan’s catastrophic handling of the Jaffar Express siege stems largely from the incompetence of its own military. It was in stark contrast to exemplary hostage rescue operations conducted by elite forces worldwide—lessons Pakistan’s military could have drawn from.
In 1980, Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS) famously executed Operation Nimrod, ending the Iranian Embassy siege in London within just 17 minutes. With precision intelligence gathered meticulously over six days, SAS commandos swiftly stormed the embassy, employing rapid entry through windows and rooftops, successfully rescuing 25 of 26 hostages while neutralising the terrorists.
Similarly, France’s elite intervention unit, GIGN, showcased outstanding capability during the 1994 Air France Flight 8969 hijacking. Commandos launched a decisive assault at Marseille Airport, swiftly storming the aircraft and eliminating all four terrorists. Through precise tactical planning, diligent intelligence-gathering, and highly coordinated execution, GIGN ensured the safety of all remaining hostages with minimal collateral damage.
Closer home, India’s National Security Guard (NSG) displayed operational excellence during the devastating 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Confronting simultaneous hostage crises at multiple locations, including the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Oberoi Trident, and Nariman House, NSG commandos rescued nearly 600 hostages over several days of intense operations. The NSG employed advanced tactics, including helicopter insertions, precise room-to-room clearances, and coordination between assault and sniper teams—significantly limiting civilian casualties despite facing heavily armed terrorists entrenched in complex urban environments.
India’s specialised railway commandos, the Commando for Railway Security (CORAS), further showcase the failure of Pakistan’s forces. Specifically trained and equipped to rapidly neutralise hostage situations involving railways, CORAS exemplifies the specialised preparation and scenario-specific response that Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) conspicuously lacked in their Jaffar Express intervention. In stark contrast, Pakistan’s Black Storks, despite their domestic reputation as “elite commandos,” displayed prolonged indecisiveness, deficient planning, poor intelligence gathering, and weak inter-agency coordination during the crisis. The delay ultimately led to catastrophic losses—including over 200 executed hostages—and showed to the world how hollow Pakistani military’s claims of power and efficiency are.
IMPACT OF INCREASING BLA ATTACKS
Over recent years, the BLA has systematically evolved from isolated guerrilla strikes to full-scale military offensives against Pakistan’s economic and security interests. The 2019 Gwadar Pearl Continental Hotel attack signalled this escalation, directly targeting Chinese interests associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Although officially downplayed by Pakistan, the BLA asserted substantial military casualties.
By 2022, the insurgency had escalated dramatically. The Karachi University bombing, executed by Shari Baloch—the BLA’s first female suicide bomber—targeted Chinese nationals, openly signalling an intensified insurgent response against foreign involvement.
Later the same year, the BLA launched prolonged and coordinated military assaults in Nushki and Panjgur, claiming over 100 Pakistani military casualties, directly challenging the military’s dominance.
In 2024, the BLA shifted toward ambitious, large-scale operations. In Operation Dara-e-Bolan, nearly 400 fighters secured a 70 km radius, including Machh town and a critical military supply route (NH-65), killing dozens of Pakistani soldiers. The subsequent Operation Herof was even larger, targeting 44 locations across 13 districts simultaneously, inflicting significant military casualties and temporarily holding territorial control.
Each attack has been met by harsh military crackdowns rather than political dialogue, reinforcing the insurgency’s resolve and ensuring its continued escalation.
CONFLICT ROOTED IN SYSTEMIC OPPRESSION
The Jaffar Express incident is a manifestation of decades of neglect and militarisation of Balochistan, a resource-rich yet politically and economically marginalised region forcibly annexed by Pakistan in 1948. Instead of addressing legitimate grievances—such as resource exploitation, enforced disappearances, and human rights abuses—Pakistan has persistently dismissed the insurgency as “foreign-sponsored terrorism.”
This persistent denial has increasingly isolated Islamabad. Recently, Pakistan accused Afghanistan of orchestrating the Jaffar Express attack, repeating a familiar deflective tactic by attributing domestic security failures to external interference. Similarly accused by Islamabad, India firmly rejected Pakistan’s claims, with India’s MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal calling these allegations “baseless” and advising Pakistan to confront its internal failures instead of resorting to blame-shifting.
EROSION OF CREDIBILITY AND ISPR’S PROPAGANDA
The continuous discrepancies between ISPR’s narratives and ground realities have significantly eroded the credibility of Pakistan’s security institutions. Journalist Zirnoor Baloch’s investigative reports highlight repeated incidents where ISPR vastly inflated militant casualties and minimised military losses, casting doubt on the military’s claims about operational successes.
This credibility crisis peaked with the Jaffar Express siege. ISPR’s premature victory declarations, contradicted by evidence from ground reports, independent investigations, and even local officials, only go to show that Pakistan’s military is more adept at propaganda than security operations.
HUMAN COSTS AND STRATEGIC LESSONS
The human toll of Pakistan’s failed military strategy is severe. Bodies flowing into hospitals in Quetta paint a troubling picture—a tragedy compounded by the military’s refusal to acknowledge its failures openly. By ignoring structural weaknesses, Pakistan’s military strategy continues to endanger civilian lives and destabilise national security.
Akhtar Mengal, former Chief Minister of Balochistan, recently remarked, “There is not a single inch of Balochistan left where the government can claim authority. They have lost this war completely and irreversibly. It is over.” What more needs to be said when such statements come from political insiders within Pakistan itself?
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WAY FORWARD
The international
The international community must urgently pressure Islamabad to address the insurgency’s political roots to avoid further instability. Without meaningful engagement and accountability, Pakistan risks plunging deeper into violence, further compromising regional stability.
Unless Islamabad internalises the lessons that came with the reported tragic loss of lives this time around, the poignant saga of the “burning train” risks repeating itself.
* Ashish Singh is an award-winning senior journalist with over 18 years of experience in defence & strategic affairs.