In the vast deserts of western China, a network of concrete missile silos stretches across the horizon—symbols of Beijing’s strategic ambitions. These structures are meant to house some of China’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Yet, according to multiple reports, the lids on these silos malfunction, rendering them ineffective in a crisis. In other cases, missiles that should have been armed with high-powered fuel were instead found to be filled with water.
Such lapses are not the result of technical failures but of something more insidious: corruption.
For years, China has sought to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military force capable of challenging the United States and its allies. But that vision is increasingly imperilled by a plague of graft that has seeped into the highest levels of China’s defence establishment.
The recent wave of corruption scandals has led to the expulsion of top-ranking generals, the removal of two defence ministers, and growing concerns among foreign intelligence analysts that China’s military capabilities may not be as formidable as they appear. At stake is President Xi Jinping’s credibility and China’s strategic ambitions—especially as tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific.
A Military in Turmoil
The extent of the problem became evident in late 2023 when China’s main political advisory body expelled three executives from state-owned missile manufacturers, followed shortly by the purge of nine generals from the national legislature. These moves coincided with the mysterious disappearance and subsequent removal of Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who was expelled from the Communist Party on corruption charges after only seven months in office.
The crackdown intensified in 2024. Admiral Miao Hua, director of the political work department on China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), was suspended for disciplinary violations. At the same time, Lieutenant General You Haito and Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng, both senior military commanders, were removed as lawmakers under vague accusations of “serious violations of laws and discipline.”
What these men had in common was that they had overseen some of China’s most sensitive and strategic defence projects, including the country’s nuclear and conventional missile forces.
“These were not just ordinary officials caught in corruption,” said a senior Indian intelligence officer who spoke on condition of anonymity. “These were the people managing some of China’s most critical military assets.”
The purge has rattled the Chinese defence establishment, with the Pentagon reporting that corruption-related investigations and removals have disrupted China’s goal of military modernisation by 2027. The United States has long viewed that deadline as a potential trigger for Beijing to attempt an armed takeover of Taiwan. But now, some officials believe the corruption crisis has complicated Xi’s military calculus.
“There’s real doubt about the PLA’s readiness,” the intelligence officer said. “It’s hard to launch a war when your missile force is riddled with corruption.”
Luxury, Bribery, and Fake Promotions
Corruption within the PLA is not new. It has thrived under China’s system of political patronage, where officers often bribe their way into promotions and lavish military contracts are inflated for personal gain.
In recent years, numerous high-ranking PLA officers and their families have been linked to luxury properties in China and abroad. Some have amassed fortunes through kickbacks from military procurement deals. Reports indicate that even admissions into PLA military academies are often secured through bribery, raising concerns about the competence of China’s future officer corps.
Meanwhile, some of the most blatant corruption cases have occurred in the procurement of weapons and military equipment. In a scandal that would have been unthinkable in a truly disciplined military, investigators found that contractors were billing the government for high-end missile fuel but delivering water
“How much of the PLA’s combat capability is real?” asked a Beijing-based military analyst, speaking anonymously to avoid repercussions. “The leadership is asking the same question.”
A Weakening Chain of Command
The corruption crisis has had an unintended consequence: the steady erosion of the authority of China’s defence minister.
Traditionally, China’s defence ministers have held key positions in both the Central Military Commission and the State Council, China’s cabinet. However, Dong Jun, the current defence minister, is an exception. Unlike his predecessors, Dong does not sit on the CMC—the body that truly controls the PLA. Nor is he a member of the State Council, reducing his influence to a historic low.
Chinese media has largely avoided mentioning Dong’s diminished role, but military analysts see it as a clear sign of deep dysfunction within the PLA leadership.
“The office of the defence minister has never been this weak,” said a senior Asian diplomat who had been posted in Beijing. “It shows that Xi Jinping doesn’t trust the position anymore.”
There are also unconfirmed reports that Dong himself is under investigation for corruption, a claim Beijing has officially denied. But given the fate of his two predecessors—both removed under murky circumstances—some wonder whether he will last the year.
Implications for China’s Military Strategy
For all the power China projects abroad, its military is facing a crisis of confidence within.
The Pentagon, in its 2024 assessment of China’s armed forces, noted that corruption may be delaying Beijing’s strategic military goals and undermining its ability to sustain major combat operations. Some US officials now believe that Xi Jinping is less likely to contemplate military action in the near future than previously thought—not because of diplomacy, but because of doubts over his own military’s reliability.
There is also concern among Chinese leadership that the United States of America and its allies have taken notice. The more the corruption crisis weakens the PLA, the greater the risk that adversaries—particularly the US, India, and Taiwan—will begin questioning China’s actual military capabilities.
“China wants to be seen as a great power,” the Beijing-based military analyst said. “But when the outside world sees the PLA’s problems, they start to wonder: is China really as strong as it claims?”
A Crisis Without an Easy Fix
Despite Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, which began in 2012, the rot within the military remains deep-seated. Analysts warn that firing generals and purging officials may remove individuals, but it doesn’t eliminate the culture of corruption that has taken root over decades.
“Unless the entire system of military appointments and promotions is overhauled, corruption will keep returning,” said the Asian diplomat. “And the PLA will continue to suffer because of it.”
For now, China remains committed to its goal of building a world-class military by 2049, the centenary of the Communist Party’s rule. But if the ongoing corruption crisis is any indication, Beijing may be learning a painful lesson: all the high-tech weapons in the world won’t matter if the military behind them is hollow.
Aritra Banerjee is a Defence, Foreign Affairs & Aerospace Columnist, Co-Author of the book ‘The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage’ and was the Co-Founder of Mission Victory India (MVI), a new-age military reforms think-tank. He has worked in TV, Print and Digital media, and has been a columnist writing on strategic affairs for national and international publications. His reporting career has seen him covering major Security and Aviation events in Europe and travelling across Kashmir conflict zones