The direction and objectives of the main offensive will only emerge with time, but so far, the actions have been quite tepid.
THE SPRING OFFENSIVE
For much of the past few months the world has been awaiting the Ukrainian Spring Offensive. Spring has gone and Summer has arrived, with little sign of the much-anticipated offensive. Then, around 10 June Zelenskyy announced that the Ukrainian offensive had finally begun, as ‘shaping operations’ like probing attacks, feints, and long-range artillery attacks on Russian depth positions began all along the 1200-kilometre-long frontage of operations.
But the Ukrainian counter-offensive actually began eight months ago on 22 September. Then, they had recaptured over 7,000 square kilometres of occupied territory in a swift offensive in the Northeast. In the South, they pushed the Russians behind the line of the Dnieper River and even re-took the vital town of Kherson.
That offensive was militarily quite brilliant, even though the gains were not as much as they were touted to be. For starters, they deceived the Russians by a series of feint attacks in the South, including well-timed tweets by Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian Southern Command, that the offensive was coming towards Kherson. This blatant deception worked. The Russians sent 13 battalion tactical groups from the Northeast to reinforce the South. Even as these were on the move, the Ukrainians—aided by helpful US intelligence—attacked the gaps in the denuded Russian lines in the Northeastern sector, capturing the towns of Balakliya, Izium, and Kupyansk and regained territory in three short weeks, that had taken the Russians months to capture. While Russian attention was on the offensive in the Northeast, (some units were already moving back after being redeployed in the South) the Ukrainians attacked again—this time in the South. They sent the equivalent of two mechanised brigades rolling down the Western bank of the Dnieper River, which forced the withdrawal of over 20-30,000 Russian troops and enabled them to recapture Kherson virtually without a fight. These gains were a huge psychological boost but taken into perspective, the Ukrainians recaptured only around 3 percent of their lost territory.
The winter pause was used by both sides to build up their tired and depleted forces and then the focus shifted to Bakhmut. This strategically insignificant town sucked in over eight Ukrainian brigades and around three to four Russian divisions beefed up by 40-50,000 mercenaries of the Wagner Group. The meat-grinder of Bakhmut drew the attention of both sides for eight months—precluding any offensive elsewhere—till its eventual fall in mid-May.
But in the intervening period, aided by Western allies, the Ukrainians had built up their offensive capability to nine “combat credible,” brigades freshly equipped with around 300 Leopard IIs tanks from Germany, Challenger IIs from UK, M1-Abrams and APCs from USA, and a mix of sophisticated, if disparate equipment.
Around six-eight additional brigades were pulled out from other sectors providing a force of 15-18 brigades for the offensive. Extensive bridging and mine breaching equipment—ploughs, trawls and explosive charges—also came in, along with HIMARS and Storm Shadow Missiles, Air Defense and Electronic Warfare devices.
That itself raises a question. The newly equipped brigades (many of them built around the core of brigades that were depleted in earlier battles) are manned have had a short training period of just around six months. Many of the crew members are recently inducted conscripts. The lack of training may show on the tactical battlefield—more so since the Ukrainian forces are familiar with Soviet era equipment and not Western ones. Plus, there will be a host of logistical problems, like building up stockpiles of different kinds of ammunition, oils and fuel, spares and other paraphernalia required for each type of equipment.
The Ukrainians have also given away their hand by announcing the offensive months in advance. In this period the Russians have prepared an elaborate system of defenses—some of them seven layers deep. Fortifications, bunkers, dragon teeth (pyramidical blocks of concrete to stop tanks) and a long, interconnected network of tunnels and trenches have come up along the likely axes of advance. Their philosophy seems to be to break the offensive when it comes, and then use the weaknesses created to launch their own counter-offensive later.
OPTIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE
And what would be the likely areas where the Ukrainians could attack? The most obvious is in the South, where they could move southwards from the direction of Zaporizhzhia towards the ports on the coastline. This first objective of this offensive is likely to be Tokmak—a crucial road and rail junction that is the logistical lifeline for the Russian positions in the South. They could then go further south towards the ports of Melitopol, Berdyansk and Mariupol on the coast. It would mean traversing 200-odd kilometres of heavily fortified territory, manned by crack troops. But if successful, it will sever the Russian land bridge, cut off all Russian troops in the South and even affect their hold on Crimea. The Southern option was handicapped by the breaching of the Nova Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro River. This has inundated around 500 square kilometres making it a “no-go” area. This now effectively protects the Russian Western flank, enabling them to withdraw crack troops of the 49th Combined Arms Army there, to beef up more threatened sectors. It is a heinous act which has caused an ecological and humanitarian disaster of epic proportions, and though Russia denies it, the act has a parallel in history. In 1941, the Soviet Army destroyed a similar dam on the Dnipro River, that flooded the area and killed thousands of Russian civilians—but delayed the advancing Germans long enough for the Soviet forces to withdraw to safety.
The second option is in the Northeast towards the Donbas to recapture vital towns and lost territory. Perhaps they could launch a pincer behind the town of Bakhmut, to encircle and decimate the Russian forces there. (Just like the Soviets did in the epic battle of Stalingrad in 1942). That would give them an immense victory and a psychological boost, but the fighting will be a slow hard grind moving slowly from village to village and town to town.
There is a third and more dangerous option. Since the Russians are expecting an attack in the South and Northeast in any case, the Ukrainians could take the all-or-nothing option and strike into Russian territory itself. They could hit the town of Belgorod, around 80 kilometres deep in Russia which is the logistical node for its troops in Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainians have already launched raids by militia groups that came dangerously close to Belgorod (perhaps they were doing a reconnaissance and testing the defenses).
An attack into Russia would mean a dangerous escalation and perhaps the US and the western allies would not permit it. But Russia already holds around 17 percent of prime Ukrainian territory. Attacking like a battering ram to regain lost area, may not attain its aim. A rapier strike inside Russia will attain more decisive results and strike a blow at the Kremlin, which could strengthen the Ukrainian position for the negotiations that could follow. Even as we go to print, the contours of the Ukrainian offensive are emerging.
There are probing attacks all along the East and the South where tank columns (identified as 47th Mechanised Brigade) equipped with Leopards tanks and Bradley APCs advanced in the Zaporizhzhia region from Orikzhiv towards Tokmak, and attempted to cross the forward minefields, losing Leopard tanks and APCs while attempting to cross. In the Northeast, the Ukrainians claim to have recaptured seven villages in the Donetsk—advancing just 5-8 kilometers in a week. Ukrainian forces have addressed virtually the entire 1,000-kilometre-long front. Any of these actions could be the focus of the main effort while the others tie down Russian troops elsewhere. The direction and objectives of the main offensive will only emerge with time, but so far, the actions have been quite tepid.
Irrespective of where the main thrust falls, this will be a long, expensive offensive that could go on for months and claim a huge toll of lives. For Ukraine, it is the last throw of the dice and a delicate, high-stakes game is unfolding.
An offensive in one sector could expose openings elsewhere, which the Russians could exploit—perhaps towards Kyiv itself. If this offensive does not attain its objectives, it will weaken Ukrainian capabilities—perhaps irrevocably—and they may not be in a position to withstand the Russian offensive that could come thereafter. It may not succeed in the slated Ukrainian aim of “evicting the last Russian from the last inch of Ukrainian territory” but if it makes significant gains that threatens the Russian hold on its land, it could put them in a better position for subsequent operations and negotiations. But should the offensive peter out without conclusive gains, the war will degenerate into a long battle of attrition, one in which the Russians, with their stronger industrial and military base, will eventually win.
Ajay Singh is the international-award winning author of six books and over 200 articles. He is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian and can be contacted at ajay88singh@yahoo.co.in