New Delhi: As the Russo-Ukrainian war approaches its third anniversary, the conflict is at a turning point. A visible sign being the cover of the latest issue of the Economist that carries an image unmistakably representative of the President Trump with his back turned. No one could have imagined this three years ago.
The war was initially perceived to result in Russia overwhelming Ukraine in a matter of weeks but that never happened. Thereafter analysts felt that Russia would collapse in the face of a united West and President Putin was portrayed as an autocratic leader with no support of his population. But he too remains in power and sanctions have not crippled Russia. Today the West is divided and the statement being drafted by the G7 to mark three years of the conflict is no longer calling Russia the aggressor.
But the fact is that after three years of an attritional conflict, Ukraine’s military is exhausted, facing worsening manpower shortages with the prospect of diminishing Western aid. While Russia, despite steady gains, hasn’t scored a decisive breakthrough and is suffering losses amid tightening economic constraints.
President Donald Trump, who had promised to end the war, has already held a long telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the first negotiations have been held in Riyadh. Meanwhile, the widening rift between President Trump and President Zelenskyy is evident. Trump denounced Zelenskyy as “a dictator without elections” and Zelenskyy said Trump was trapped in a Russian disinformation bubble, in response to the US President suggesting Ukraine started the war.
No analyst or AI could have visualised these developments three years ago. But more telling is that a new security architecture is taking shape in Europe and the Europeans are being forced to look at their image in the mirror by the US. Last week’s Munich Security Conference marked that moment when the US told Europe emphatically that it could not rely on transatlantic support
THE WAR TODAY
It is difficult to find predictions that a long, high-intensity war in Europe was possible in the twenty-first century. But since February 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has delivered exactly that. Thousands of Russians and Ukrainians have died. Many more have been injured. Towns have been reduced to ruin or cut apart by obstacle systems, in a grim reminder of World War I.
Both sides are locked in combat with little visible movement
FOCUS IS NOW PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Ceasefire is relatively easy but resolving issues where incompatible collisions of reality exist is challenging. When peace talks begin, they will be difficult and complex. While questions about territory will most likely be settled based on the captured territories, with the US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth terming Ukraine’s goals of recovering all its territory and NATO membership “unrealistic”. But Ukraine’s long-term security will be the sticking point.
Several alternatives were analysed earlier, including NATO membership with its Article 5 guarantee, a bi- or multilateral security guarantee from the US or a group of European states, or “armed neutrality” which would leave Ukraine with no security guarantee but with substantial military assistance. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy harped on NATO membership being the only way to ensure a lasting peace, many current alliance members, including the US, were unwilling to take on the additional security burden.
However, following the US Defence Secretary’s speech on 12 February and President Trumps telephone call with President Putin NATO is off the table, and the US is refusing to send troops or Agree to Article 5. The concern is therefore on ways to provide a security guarantee for Ukraine. But Ukraine’s armed neutrality would, however, come with responsibilities for NATO members, especially in Europe, to help it build its arsenal and fortify the continent’s own defences.
As per analyst David Ignatius the Biden administration’s strategy was for extending the war to weaken Russia, “It was a sensible, cold-blooded strategy for the US at low cost to America, while Ukraine was paying the butcher’s bill”.
The Trump administration has now changed the rules of engagement. The reality is that not only has Ukraine failed to regain any significant territory in the last two years, but the very same issues that the parties grappled with in the 2022 negotiations are likely to be at the centre of any talks.
SECURITY
GUARANTEES
There are those who feel that an imposed peace deal that leaves Ukraine with no support might embolden Russia to launch a third invasion into Ukraine. This would once again put Moscow and NATO at risk of direct conflict, while Russian geographic gains would further erode Ukraine’s sovereign territory and allow Russia to pose new threats to Ukraine’s neighbours.
Security guarantees can address this problem by offering one or both sides an assurance that renewed aggression will be met with consequences, including external military support and retaliation. Ensuring peace could come in the form of a peace keeping mission.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has said that his country could send troops, but French President Emmanuel Macron who had previously pledged such deployments has now, backed off his original commitment. Poland, a vocal supporter of Ukraine, has flatly denied plans to send troops to Ukraine. A mere paper guarantee of a commitment to send troops in case of future attacks is also not be credible on its own. So far either European states nor the US have sent troops to Ukraine.
Policymakers therefore need to consider alternatives to direct security guarantees: how to boost Ukraine’s own deterrent capabilities while addressing the conflict’s underlying causes. Ultimately, such steps are likely to be more credible and more effective than a peacekeeping force overly reliant on the US for crucial support in areas such as surveillance and military logistics.
Of course, Ukraine’s preferred security guarantee is a rapid accession to NATO. In December 2024, Zelenskyy even told European leaders that “An invitation for Ukraine to join NATO is a necessary thing for our survival.”
But a bilateral US security guarantee for Ukraine would be unacceptable to Moscow and unworkable for the trans-Atlantic alliance, whether it took the form of a more binding mutual defence agreement like the US-Japanese treaty relationship or something more flexible like the 1975 US memorandum of agreement with Israel.
The fact is that notwithstanding President Trump’s recent stance, the US has long been clear that Ukraine’s alignment is not a national security imperative. Speaking in 2016, President Barack Obama acknowledged the limited US stakes in Ukraine, arguing that “we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for.” Or to quote former President Richard Nixon, “Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.”
European guarantees to Ukraine might seem more credible on the surface. After all, Europe has a common interest in balancing Russia with an independent Ukraine as a buffer. If Ukraine were to become a member of the European Union, for example, it would fall under the Lisbon Treaty’s mutual defence provision. Although the provision is modeled on NATO’s Article 5, it has not been sanctified in the same way and remains more ambiguous in nature. Still, a European security commitment would bring its own limitations and complications for NATO.
ARMED NEUTRALITY AND ITS BENEFITS
The final option, “armed neutrality,” has no foreign security guarantees, but it won’t leave Ukraine defenceless. As a neutral state, Ukraine would still need significant military support from the US and Europe to build an arsenal capable of deterring Russia and defending its territory.
Critics have deemed armed neutrality “doomed to fail,” but it seems to be Ukraine’s best option. In this scenario, Kyiv would be responsible for its own security. It would have to invest in rebuilding its defence-industrial base and strengthening and modernizing its combat capabilities over the long term, with help from the US and Europe.
But along with the burdens of independence, it would also receive the benefits of self-sufficiency. History offers frequent reminders that the only truly “ironclad” defence is the one a country provides itself.
INDIA AND THE WAR
India has been consistent in its stance regarding the war and the Prime Minister has reiterated time and again that this is not an era of war. The focus needs to be on dialogue and diplomacy and negotiations to end the war.
India has also held a balanced position and the Prime Minister has visited both Moscow and Kyviv stating that we stand on the side of peace. But at the same time the West has targeted India for its deep economic, defence and energy partnerships and strategic ties, friendship and dealings with Russia. There is no doubt that with the current changes in US policy, India’s stand has been vindicated.
The many lessons that emerged from the war have resulted in militaries reexamining doctrines and accelerating the pace of their battlefield and strategic adaptation.
The war has proven that drones, AI, and other kinds of advanced technology are important arbiters of success on the ground and in the air. The tentacles of technological insertions have enabled the meshing of AI, civil and military sensor networks, and the democratisation of battlefield information.
But what stands out is that there is a need to develop hard power as a deterrence capability. And for that apart from military structures, weapons systems, training, tactics, technology and doctrines building a robust defence industrial base backed both by research and development and manufacturing is essential. The fact is that in any conflict one stands alone. Hence the significance of Atmanirbhar.
CONCLUSION
All wars end at some time but how they end is also important as the ending determines the peace that is to follow. The end of both World War II and the Cold War chartered the course that Europe followed but now what is important is the unveiling of the new security architecture in Europe which will have global implications.
At the end of the Cold War, there was an assumption that liberal democracy and globalization had triumphed. Many believed that the era of large conventional wars had come to an end. This prompted leaders to downsize their countries’ military forces, munition stocks, and production capacity. The situation in Ukraine has shown that such optimism was misguided
Unfortunately, the complexities of this conflict preclude quick solutions. But regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, the war in Ukraine has already changed the character of conflict around the world. Countries now need to adapt to the new realities on the battlefield. However, the credibility of the global policymakers now depends on how soon and in what manner this war ends.
* Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM retired from the Indian Army.