FD 2030 is not an ‘add-on’ to existing Marine Corps capabilities that were still useful in many situations. Instead, the Marines will try to give up existing capability and eventually replace it with what FD 2030 called for.
How is it that successful organizations end up committing self-harm—and often in attempts to adapt and keep up with the times? I don’t really know why, but suspect the ancient Greeks and Indians knew all about this aspect of the human experience and human nature.
I had occasion to work for two such outfits—Motorola and the United States Marine Corps.
FIRST MOTOROLA
It was one of America’s most respected companies for decades. Indeed the name evoked American technological and manufacturing prowess and dominance. But by the late 1990s it was stumbling. And during the 2000s it started a downward spiral to the point where now it’s barely a husk of what it was, and a big chunk of old Motorola is Chinese owned.
Motorola’s decision to go into the PRC big-time (with US government encouragement) shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre didn’t help. Nor did adopting hare brained new-age Human Resources schemes—ironically resembling the Marine Corps’ new “Talent Management” mantras.
But one of the killer blows was Motorola spinning off its semiconductor business. The company was a world leader in the industry—and had a leading role in the development of the “chip.” As one engineer put it: “when a semiconductor factory is firing on all cylinders it’s close to having your own printing press printing money.”
Unfortunately, management and financial whiz kids convinced Motorola’s leadership that chips were a “commodities” business and there was no need to actually produce your own semiconductors. Better to outsource the work to others (who could make chips cheaper than you could), and just be a “knowledge company”—leveraging others to do the hard work of making things while collecting royalty checks.
It was akin to chopping off one’s left arm because it gets tired after a while.
But this is what the smart guys insisted was the future for all businesses—and Motorola had no choice but to adjust. It was an alluring scenario and Motorola fell for it.
These days, few Americans under the age of 50 even know what Motorola is.
NOW TO THE MARINE CORPS…
Then-Marine commandant, General David Berger introduced a new plan for the Marines called Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) in 2019. He aimed to make the Marine Corps into a more mobile force, operating in smaller “low-signature” units in austere coastal locations and using long range missiles to dominate the nearby sea—thus facilitating broader naval campaigns.
Although proponents later argued this concept applies anywhere on the globe, FD 2030 was rolled out with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a future war in the Pacific in mind.
To this writer at least, the plan was a breath of fresh air.
THE WAY IT WAS
The Marine Corps was finally paying attention to the Asia-Pacific—and to China in particular. Until then the focus was the “sandbox”—Iraq and Afghanistan. Asia was a backwater. Top Marine commanders in Hawaii would return from Washington irked by the lack of interest in the region.
Even worse, call the People’s Republic of China an adversary and the courtiers at Headquarters Marine Corps would come after you.
Indeed, at the Marine Corps’ Pacific headquarters some staff officers downplayed the China-threat and were content with business as usual. The Marines even turned down opportunities to establish a presence in certain regional countries, and the idea of sending a half-dozen young Marine officers to key locations in the region to “influence” was forcefully rejected. Haven’t got six officers to spare, you know, and what use would they be anyway?
The Marines needed some new thinking—starting with recognizing China as an adversary.
FD 2030
The Commandant’s plan did this and aimed to use regional geography—archipelagos and islands—to make life difficult for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. And it was shifting the Marines away from the narrow, comfortable mindset of large amphibious units operating from large fixed bases—and offering easy targets for Chinese missiles.
This was all good. And overdue.
However, there were a few questions about the plan that nobody could quite answer.
Where to put the small detached missile units?
It didn’t seem like this had been figured out.
Ironically, Marine Forces Pacific (MFP)’s G5 (Studies and Analysis) section had developed connections throughout the region over the previous 20 years and could have helped—if it hadn’t been disbanded a couple years earlier by the then-MFP commanding general, David Berger.
When asked why this was done, staff members gave embarrassed shrugs.
The General did something similar a couple years earlier while commanding the1st Marine Expeditionary Force in California.
In both cases, the G5s were quietly rebuilt after General Berger departed. But the damage was done.
How to hide the units?
It was said they would be small and “low signature” and would move around. But that might not be so easy or effective. Missile batteries are not small. And Westerners and other foreigners stand out. Chinese-run shops and commercial activities are all over the Pacific islands. Once spotted, the Marine units might find themselves running for their lives.
This writer was told that one reason not to worry so much about this issue is that the Chinese will not “waste a missile” on such small units. Really.
How to supply the units?
Have them forage for chickens and lizards? There was talk of building 35 light amphibious ships. Besides the risk of the enemy “tracking” them to the Marine detachments, one Marine General noted, without any apparent embarrassment, they’d have to be pulled back in the event things got dangerous—since they weren’t built to take a hit. And what happens to wounded Marines who need to be evacuated?
The Marines are reportedly still working on the logistics piece of the puzzle.
Could the role of the small dispersed Marine units (spotting enemy ships and launching missiles at them) be done by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or aircraft?
If so, might that be a more efficient approach?
One would have expected these issues were better addressed or resolved before rolling out FD 2030.
You knew somebody was going to ask.
If the designers missed these things, what else did they miss?
The plan was now making one feel like John the Apostle. “…it was in my mouth sweet as honey: and (soon after) I had eaten it, my belly was bitter.” (Rev 10:10)
DIVEST TO INVEST
In addition, in order to implement FD 2030 and to acquire long range missiles, light amphibious ships, and the like, the Marine Corps considerably reduced its infantry, aircraft, and artillery—and eliminated its tanks and even its “bridging” equipment (helpful for getting across rivers and gullies) that one still finds on even the modern battlefield.
In other words, FD 2030 was not an “add-on” to existing Marine Corps capabilities that were still useful in many situations. Instead, the Marines would give up existing capability and eventually replace it with what FD 2030 called for.
They called it, “divest to invest”.
This was akin to a carpenter tossing tools out of his tool box—some of which he knows he’ll need while waiting for a smaller amount of new untested tools to arrive.
The idea was this was the necessary price to pay—both financially and capability-wise—for revamping the Marine Corps.
One heard different justifications—centered on money and/or the changing nature of warfare.
The money saved by shedding tanks, artillery, aircraft, troops, bridging and some essential breaching equipment would be used for buying long range rockets and other hardware and expenses associated with the FD 2030 concept.
A tough decision, it was said, but purse strings are tight in DC—despite Congress spending like drunken sailors on everything else.
Note the White House and part of Congress’ ability to conjure up $65 billion for Ukraine recently—more than the annual budget of the Marine Corps.
Divesting to save money to spend on FD 2030 is a noble gesture and makes the Marine Corps feel good about itself…but nobody much cares.
Trying to game Congressional spending is a fool’s errand. Instead, it would be better to spend what you have prudently and do your job well. And if you need more money for something else—and the Marines wouldn’t have been asking for much—make the case.
If Congress and the White House refused, get them on record as being unwilling to spend what’s necessary to defend the nation—from a threat that is widely recognized these days. And a Commandant should be willing to resign to make the point to the American public.
At least that’s how it looked to this writer after years in the private and government sectors. Preemptively cut your budget—even self-sacrificing gestures such as flying economy class to save money—and you’ll be considered demented.
Another justification for “divest to invest” was that the discarded hardware won’t be missed since warfare has changed and is changing. Tanks, tubed-artillery, and aircraft are neither needed nor survivable, it was said. Moreover, amphibious assaults were declared obsolete. Satellites, precision long-range weaponry, and drone swarms made them so—even though one wondered by what magic the dispersed Marine missile teams were invisible to enemy technical surveillance and long-range weapons.
Anyway, this all could be true.
But it presumes remarkable clairvoyance about future conflicts—where, when, and how they’ll be fought. If you can do that you ought to also be able to make a bundle on sports betting and the stock market.
LESSONS FROM UKRAINE
The lessons of Ukraine do demonstrate that shore launched long-range missiles can “close off” large stretches of ocean—driving off and sometimes sinking the Russian Navy. But at the same time, tanks and regular “tubed” artillery of the kind the Marines disposed of are still being used and in demand—by both sides of the fight.
Indeed, the Ukraine war in certain respects resembles “old fashioned” warfare of the early and mid-20th century, or even the early 21st century.
So warfare perhaps hasn’t yet changed as much as FD 2030 proponents claim. And the Marines should have hedged their bets.
Raise this point—and after being told you’re an idiot—you’d hear that the Marine Corps still has enough firepower left over to take on any and all enemies—despite giving up what one Marine infantry officer called “an eye-popping amount of capability to kill people at close range (where most of the killing is done).”
And in the case of tanks and bridging equipment, if they should be needed (despite the changing nature of future warfare that supposedly made them obsolete according to FD 2030 designers), the US Army will provide them (and presumably when needed).
Really. Does anyone care to bet on that?
And, intentionally or not, one knock on effect of the Commandant prioritizing small, dispersed missile teams as the Corp’s primary mission was that it sent a message to the US Navy that the Marine Corps didn’t need so many of the large amphibious ships that historically give the Marines global reach.
As a result, the Navy’s amphibious fleet (and building new “amphibs”) went even farther down the US Navy’s priority list—if that was possible.
The amphibious ship shortage was a longstanding problem even before General Berger and FD2030. But expect more instances where the Marines are unable to respond world-wide when needed, as happened last year following a natural disaster in Turkey and a short-notice need to evacuate Americans from Sudan.
The Commandant said afterwards that he felt he’d let down the “Combatant Commander”—who he is obligated to support. That’s true. But even more he let down the nation.
WE DON’T DO WINDOWS
The shift to FD 2030 implicitly declared that the Marines won’t conduct extended land combat operations or fighting on any large scale—since they don’t want to.
Bringing to mind a prickly housekeeper who “doesn’t do windows” or “work past 5” the Marine Corps decided it would only fight wars of the sort it wants to fight—rather than in any clime and place and whenever the nation calls its “911 Force”.
General Berger might have run that by the American public that expects more of the Marine Corps.
Unless our enemies cooperate and fight the way we want them to, FD 2030 has left some gaps that will need to be covered.
Give the missions (and the money) to the US Army. And presumably a much smaller Marine Corps than its current 172,000 Marines is in order.
A NEEDED CHANGE GONE TOO FAR?
The Marine Corps needed change. But I’d say it gave up too much for FD 2030.
As one friend noted: “I sometimes wonder if the proponents are placing too much emphasis on innovation and too little on the traditional blocking and tackling skills, so-to-speak. It’s one thing to be innovative but another to divest needed capabilities in order to do so.”
Another observer added: “To cut out three divisions worth of supporting arms, replace combat power with renamed ‘Littoral’ regiments—and burden them with the single operational concept of a better uniformed Houthi rocket squad reenacting the Wake Island defense—appallingly poor judgment. At the same time, to allow Marine Air Wings to wither—leaving the same number of squadrons but with fewer aircraft in each (calls to mind ‘ghost soldiers’ in a developing country)—who is this supposed to fool?”
But such concerns with FD 2030 are misinformed, or so we’re told. This cocksureness seems familiar, and is troubling.
The FD 2030 acolytes have an answer for everything. They tout having thoroughly wargamed and modeled the plan. So did Robert McNamara’s whiz-kids who had victory in the Vietnam War down to a mathematical certainty. But not quite, as it turned out. And recall the lead up to the 2008 financial collapse. The bankers had algorithms that eliminated “risk” for the first time in human history. Nothing to worry about. And if you challenged them, you “just don’t get it.”
Nowadays, question FD 2030 and stand by for ad hominem attack.
One venomous attack on retired Marine Generals opposing FD 2030, sneeringly called them “the grandparents” who were interfering with the parents in raising the grandchildren—and they should shut up.
Arguments are better won via persuasion rather than ridicule. And one notes the gentleman making this attack had championed the U.S. Navy’s troubled Littoral Combat Ship early on. Having helped foist that disaster on the Navy and the nation, a little circumspection might have been in order.
A ROLE FOR CONGRESS?
FD 2030 proponents point to Congressional support for the plan. But getting certain Congressmembers and staffers on board with FD 2030 was perhaps not so hard. It rarely is.
One recalls a former CIA officer dismissing the Congressional oversight committees’ oversight: “Tell them a few stories, give them some show-and-tell, and they’ll think they’re dealing with Mr Bond himself.”
The FD 2030 Marines presumably were equally persuasive on Capitol Hill. Marines usually are.
But after lobbying by skeptics of the plan—led by retired Marine Corps general officers—some people on Capitol Hill may be having second thoughts about FD 2030. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) calls for a formal review of FD 2030 by a “federally funded research and development center.”
Hopefully Congress chooses the right one. Some are better than others.
The acolytes are resisting the independent review. Responding with the equivalent of a Greta Thunberg “How DARE you?” But shouldn’t they welcome it, as it would presumably confirm the plan’s soundness once and for all?
Ironically, if FD 2030’s creators—a relatively small, select group and seemingly sworn to secrecy—had solicited input more widely from the beginning they could have avoided much pain and caused less harm to the organization. And even more importantly, they could have produced a better plan that would really give fits to America’s enemies.
The damage has already been done, however.
Rebuilding Marine Corps capabilities—if that’s doable—is going to take some clear thinking and an admission by somebody or somebodies who matter that they—or the organization—got some things wrong.
As for this being “too hard”, one might note that being a Lance Corporal on a breaching party in Fallujah is “too hard”. Readjusting FD 2030 merely falls into the “requires some effort” category by comparison.
Given the animosity this topic is generating among Marines, writing a piece such as this is akin to attending a bear-baiting contest in 17th century England and thinking: “Hmmm….I wonder what it’s like down in the pit. Think I’ll go find out.”
At least I’ll only be removed from a few Christmas card lists, called names, and blacklisted at Quantico. If FD 2030 really does have the gaps it seems to, it’ll be the individual Marines, the United States, and its allies who pay the real price. We owe it to them to find out.
Grant Newsham is a retired U.S. Marine Colonel and the author of “When China Attacks”.