The emerging rift between Merkel and Putin gained international traction when Putin brought his dog, allegedly to frighten Merkel, during the 2007 negotiations in Sochi, Russia.
Jörg Kukies, the State Secretary in the German Federal Chancellery, recently announced that Germany would completely stop buying coal and oil from Russia on 1 August and 31 December, respectively. Considered a key determinant of European security, the carefully managed bilateral relationship has succumbed to the geopolitical pressures in Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The shift in Berlin’s approach towards Moscow is further marked by the deterioration of factors that led to the careful structing of relations mainly: energy trade, personal ties, and foreign policy.
ENERGY RELATIONSHIP
Ever since its reunification, energy trade has remained a constant in Russia-Germany relations. The underlining logic was simple. Russia would provide cheap and reliable energy supplies in exchange for German technology and capital. Energy imports played a vital role in spurring Germany’s economic growth while also easing the burden of East-West German integration. Consequently, energy trade become an essential part of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Frank Walter Steinmeier’s Ostpolitk in an attempt to foster closer ties between Moscow and Berlin and other EU capitals. This policy of change through trade was carried forward despite, warnings from East European partners over Germany’s growing energy reliance on Russia and the geopolitical problems it would cause for European security.
Energy trade grew, surviving several fissures in Russia-EU relations as exemplified by the Georgia-Russia war (2008), Ukraine-Russia gas price wars (2008-09), EU’s Third Energy Package (2009), and the annexation of Crimea (2014). Although Berlin condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine by supporting sanctions against Putin’s administration and providing financial assistance to Kyiv, the energy relationship remained intact. The controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline progressed enduring pressure from both the Trump administration and East European countries. In fact, in 2015, Wintershall and Gazprom signed an agreement granting Gazprom control of two German gas storage facilities in exchange for Wintershall receiving a stake in the Urengoy gas field in Western Siberia.
However, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has significantly altered the situation. In its first noteworthy reaction, after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and the Luhansk, Chancellor Olaf Scholz stalled the Nord Stream 2 pipeline by putting its certifying process on hold. This, Scholz did despite the reservations of the business lobby as well as the sanctions waiver granted by the Biden administration to Nord Stream 2 AG last May. In a series of moves that followed, Germany called for the creation of strategic coal and gas reserves, announced the construction of 4 floating terminals and 2 permanent onshore sites for increased LNG imports, signed an energy partnership with Qatar, and backed several rounds of EU sanctions targeting Russian individuals, firms, and banks. These actions indicate Berlin’s commitment to reduce its dependence on Russian energy regardless of the challenges it is facing in securing gas supplies and filling the required winter storage gas capacity. Public opinion also favours the government’s response as 70% of Germans feel that the government should continue to support Ukraine despite the economic fallout.
PERSONAL TIES AND TRUST
Like energy, personal ties between German and Russian leaders also played a pivotal role in shaping bilateral relations. Friendship between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev paved the way for German reunification as demonstrated through their famous “walk along the Rhine” (1989) summit and their meeting in Archyz in the Caucasus mountains. Gorbachev developed a deep trust for both Kohl and Germany and gave his consent for a unified Germany becoming part of NATO—something which had long been anathema to Kremlin. Similarly, the friendship and trust between Kohl and Yeltsin was also strong. Kohl’s insistence on providing financial aid to Russia and Yeltsin’s decision to accelerate the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany in 1994 at Kohl’s request added to the atmosphere of trust. Kohl regarded Yeltsin as a trusted partner and the best guardian of democratic development in Russia.
Personal ties continued to grow at the turn of the century. Chancellor Schröder described President Putin as a flawless democrat and a modernizer. Their friendship was instrumental in the completion of the Nord Stream I natural gas pipeline—the first pipeline directly connecting Russia with Germany. However, Merkel’s arrival began reversing the trend. Her life and experiences of East Germany shaped her perceptions of Russia and Putin. The pragmatism favoured by past administrations was replaced by criticism of Russia’s human rights record. Moving away from Schröder’s policy, Merkel pursued a more equi-distanced foreign policy aimed at repairing relations with the US in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq crisis. The emerging rift between Merkel and Putin gained international traction when Putin brought his dog, allegedly to frighten Merkel, during the 2007 negotiations in Sochi, Russia.
Situation further deteriorated following the Georgia-Russia war of 2008, Putin’s re-election as the President of Russia in 2012 and the events in Ukraine in 2014. Particularly with the annexation of Crimea and the downing of the Malaysian airline MH 17, the German political class became more critical of Russia. The atmosphere of trust and personal ties was replaced by cynicism and trust deficit. Even though Merkel had supported the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, she called out Russia’s activities in Crimea as criminal and accused her Russian counterparts of lying and deception. The decline in the personal relationship between Putin and Merkel gravely damaged bilateral relations.
The current German government has inherited its relations with Russia, at a time when the level of trust is incredibly low. According to a survey by the Pew Research Centre, confidence in Putin is the lowest in Germany among the surveyed world leaders. Even the most ardent supporters of relations with Russia, for instance, Frank Walter Steinmeier and Matthias Platzeck, have admitted of making mistakes over their Russia policy and misreading Putin’s intentions. The current coalition heads have also not shied away from openly criticizing the Russian President. Climate and Economic Minister Robert Habeck has expressed scepticism over continued gas supplies from Russia. In a recent interview, Habeck accused Putin of blackmailing Germany with energy supplies for acceptance of his murderous actions in Ukraine. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock also accused Russia of breaking agreements that ensured continental peace, accelerating the food crises in the global south, and using hunger as a weapon to demand allegiance. And while Olaf Scholz has been criticised for his slow response and his delayed visit to Kyiv, he has also categorically made it clear that in this current situation Putin is the aggressor and no one else.
FOREIGN POLICY AND ATLANTICISM
The trust deficit is equally reflected in Germany’s inclination towards Atlanticism. Hitherto, bilateral relations were based on the assumptions that modernization and democratization of Russia would ensure regional stability. However, Russia’s action in Ukraine have challenged this assumption. More importantly, they have gone against the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, no use of force, peaceful resolution of conflicts, adherence to international law and development of good neighbourly relations, which are all fundamental to Germany’s understanding of post-Cold War Europe.
This has triggered the German government to make a paradigm shift in its foreign policy. Earlier, Germany had emphasised diplomatic means of conflict resolution. But as the war progressed, Germany made several changes to its “peace policy”. It not only sent both light and heavy weapons to Ukraine, but also engaged in an arms swap deal with several European partners to provide swift military assistance to Kyiv. In mid-April, Scholz announced an increase in funding of military aid to third countries to around €2 billion, half of which is directed towards Ukraine. The government also decided to allocate €400 million as part of the German contribution to the European Peace Facility, through which the EU provides direct military assistance to Ukraine.
In solidarity with the NATO alliance, Germany also vowed to increase defence spending to 2% of the GDP with an additional one-time boost of €100 billion. The Bundeswehr is also deployed in Enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania as means of defending every centimetre of NATO’s territory. By the end of the year, Berlin is also expected to finalise its national security strategy, which is likely to sync with NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass. Further, Berlin has also supported EU and NATO expansion and consented the admission of Finland and Sweden into NATO and the candidature of Ukraine in EU.
Underlining these changes are the growing differences between Russia and Germany about what led to German unification and the expansion of NATO and the EU thereafter. Merkel had acknowledged this problem with Russia’s thinking about the post-Cold War European order and its alleged mistreatment by the West. The crisis in Ukraine is reflective of this widening difference between German and Russian thinking towards European security.
Trivun Sharma is a PhD Student in International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland.