Chinese scholars generally agree that under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India has gradually shifted away from the “scorched earth” defensive strategy to adopt a deterrence-oriented approach, prioritizing the vigorous development of border infrastructure.
Since Narendra Modi assumed office as India’s Prime Minister in 2014, Government of India has placed a strong emphasis on enhancing the country’s border infrastructure. This shift represents a strategic transformation from previous defence policies, which primarily focused on deterrence and reactive measures. The development of border infrastructure aims to counter China’s rapid expansion along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and strengthen India’s territorial security. Additionally, it plays a vital role in improving connectivity, fostering regional development, and enhancing military preparedness. Beijing has frequently expressed opposition to India’s infrastructure projects along the LAC, viewing them as a challenge to its territorial claims and strategic advantage. The following analysis is based on articles authored by Chinese scholars, offering insight into China’s perspective on India’s border development efforts.
One, Chinese scholars generally agree that under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, India has gradually shifted away from the “scorched earth” defensive strategy (“坚壁清野”防御战略) that it had implemented in its border regions since 1962. Instead, India has adopted a deterrence-oriented approach, prioritizing the vigorous development of border infrastructure. Duan Bin, an Associate Researcher at the Institute of Human and Environmental Studies of the Tibetan Plateau, Lanzhou University, argues that “India’s border infrastructure development has entered a transformative phase, characterized by strategic foresight, substantial financial investments, and the adoption of innovative technologies.” This shift, he suggests, reflects a nuanced understanding of the deep interconnection between national security and economic growth.
Two, in terms of financial investment, Duan observes that as India’s GDP expanded from $360.2 billion in 1995 to $3.57 trillion in 2023, funding for border infrastructure projects has also seen a significant rise. Citing data from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), he notes that between 2018 and 2023, India allocated Rs 154.7 billion (approximately $1.877 billion) for road construction along the India-China border, resulting in the creation of 2,088.57 kilometres of new roads. This investment surpasses the total expenditure on border road development by the Indian government between 2011 and 2016. Furthermore, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)’s budget for the 2022-2023 fiscal year reached an all-time high of Rs 12.34 billion.
Duan further highlights that on 28 November 2024, Government of India allocated Rs 400 billion (approximately 34.28 billion RMB) for the construction and upgrading of a 1,637-km border highway (NH913) in Arunachal Pradesh, connecting 12 districts and 1,683 villages. Of this amount, Rs 282.29 billion have already been approved, with construction expected to commence in the 2025-2026 fiscal year. According to Duan, the India-China Border Roads (ICBR) project has become the primary blueprint for strengthening border infrastructure under Prime Minister Modi’s administration. He asserts that NH913, which runs along the McMahon Line, is designed to interconnect towns, villages, and military posts throughout the region. Similarly, he notes that five infrastructure projects in Mizoram are intended to establish a new strategic supply route via the Bay of Bengal, utilizing the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh. This development aims to reduce India’s traditional dependence on the narrow Siliguri Corridor, a vital but vulnerable link connecting the north-eastern states to the rest of India.
The BRO launched 102 infrastructure projects in 2021, with a total cost of Rs 22.29 billion. These projects included 22 roads, 63 bridges, 2 helicopter landing pads, 2 airports, and the Nechiphu Tunnel in the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh. Among them, 36 projects are located in Arunachal Pradesh, while 26 are in Ladakh, with the remaining distributed across Jammu and Kashmir, Mizoram, Himachal Pradesh, and other regions. According to Yang Xinyu of the Institute of International Studies, Wuhan University, these infrastructure developments span the western, central, and eastern sectors of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Additionally, the 73 strategic road projects approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security in 2006 feature prominently in Duan’s analysis. However, He Xianqing points out that, of the approximately 3,500 kilometres of planned roads under this project, only 500 kilometres had been completed by the end of 2014.
Three, reforms in bureaucratic decision
According to He Xianqing, key policy changes have greatly improved India’s border infrastructure. The MoD took control of border road development and the BRO in 2014. Reforms in 2017 enabled project outsourcing, streamlined equipment procurement, and simplified financial approvals and environmental licensing. In 2020, the government revised the BADP, identified strategic villages, and allocated an additional 10% of the budget to border areas in five states along the India-China border. He notes that border road construction accelerated only after PM Modi took office. Additionally, the MoD identified 14 strategic railway lines in Northern India, built seven advanced landing grounds in Arunachal Pradesh, and operationalized five dual-use civil-military airports in Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Sikkim.
Four, He argues that the Modi government’s push for border infrastructure development is aimed at narrowing the gap with China, establishing all-weather operational capabilities in border regions, and adopting a stance that treats China as an adversary while appealing to nationalist sentiments. According to He, the lack of border infrastructure was previously considered “a strategic error” (战略性错误), and the current efforts seek to “connect points to lines, and lines to areas.” He contends that the Indian government has “actively constructed” (积极营造) an image of India as a “victim” (受害者) in border disputes, portraying the absence of infrastructure as a key factor behind China’s “aggression” into Indian territories. The Galwan incident, in this perspective, is interpreted as a “provocation driven by China’s fear of India’s infrastructure progress.”
Five, He argues that India’s border infrastructure has strengthened military patrols, deployments, and logistical support, raising the risk of friction with China. He claims it has bolstered India’s military preparedness (“整军备战”) and border operations capability (“边境行动能力”), enabling forces to reach previously inaccessible areas, which he believes fuels India’s perception that all patrolable areas are its territory. He cites the Daulat Beg Oldie road (DS-DBO road) as key to troop and logistics movement and highlights the Sela, Zoji La, and Shinku La tunnels as landmark projects. He views post-Galwan negotiations as reflecting this strategic shift.
Six, scholars argue that the Modi government has heavily relied on funding, machinery, and technology from the US and its allies for border infrastructure. Duan notes that under the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement with the US, India acquired high-altitude construction equipment and Austrian tunnel excavation technology. By 2024, the BRO had procured 831 engineering machines worth Rs 25.3 billion, including tunnel diggers from Sweden’s Sandvik and hydraulic drills from France’s Manitou. Duan also highlights India’s construction of 87 bridges in 2021, 67 in 2022, and 63 in Arunachal Pradesh in 2023, as well as its adoption of advanced road construction technologies from Japan, the US, and Europe.
Seven, as countermeasures, Chinese scholars recommend that China further strengthen its own infrastructure along the border to “maintain strategic pressure” (战略压力) on India. This includes improving information infrastructure to enhance the use of drones for monitoring Indian border activities. They suggest that China should upgrade or negotiate new military confidence-building measures to prevent minor altercations from escalating into larger conflicts. Additionally, they propose holding “2+2 dialogues” between the defence and foreign ministers of both countries. Establishing a “monitoring-response-action” collaborative mechanism is also seen as essential for tracking Indian border activities and enabling a swift response to any perceived encroachments.
In the final analysis, the articles acknowledge the rapid pace of border infrastructure development under Prime Minister Modi. Chinese scholars describe this expansion as a cross-network development of roads, aviation, and railways, creating a comprehensive land-air transportation system that reduces reliance on any single mode of transport. They argue that India’s border infrastructure has spillover effects on neighbouring countries and regions, helping India advance its connectivity projects and export its infrastructure expertise. They conclude that India is likely to continue strengthening its border infrastructure for military, domestic, and diplomatic reasons, including its “Neighbourhood First,” “Act East,” and “SAGAR” (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision.
He, while agreeing with Duan, argues that India’s border information infrastructure remains relatively underdeveloped, as the country continues to rely on 3G and 4G networks in border areas. He points out significant deficiencies in virtual network capabilities, electromagnetic spectrum utilization, and space battlefield capabilities. Wang Jianping and Gao Ya, in a 2022 research paper, discuss the concept of “smart fences” (智能围栏) implemented by India since 2018 as part of its digital border security efforts, but largely to the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh and Myanmar borders. While acknowledging their positive impact in combating illegal immigration, criminal organizations, and terrorism, they also highlight challenges such as the high financial burden, a shortage of technical expertise, and difficulties in ongoing maintenance.
* B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi