One can well imagine the battle for the tunnels and rubble of Gaza, where IDF’s technological edge will reduce Hamas’ ability to fight overland, while the Hamas might draw the IDF into bitter and isolated tunnel battles.
Wars are about scope and scale. Ideally speaking, the political purpose must drive the scope and scale of war, and in that order. But then, nation-states tend to stumble into war more by imperatives of a quick military response rather than a well-thought-out scope of war. The surprise attack by Hamas in southern Israel on 7 October 2023 exemplifies this paradox. Whether Hamas wilfully or otherwise chose to scale up the lingering violence in Gaza, it left no easy choices for Israel, but to choose a maximalist line. Ever-since, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have struck at Hamas with impunity to much cheer and criticism of the international community.
SCOPE AND SCALE
Israel wasn’t expected not to respond militarily to Hamas atrocities. While the scale of military punishment is driven by the sheer outrage and collective pain of the Israeli state, the scope of retribution will be limited by Israel’s net capacity and capability, and the prevailing international opinion. The scope of war is easy to define or pronounce, but the military scale is difficult to fashion and deliver, when your adversary is both crafty and illusive, and an agile subterranean fighter. The real military-strategic challenge is to find the ways, means and ends i.e., the right scope and scale that justifies a strong military action, while minimizing unintended international and regional ramifications. Even if the IDF were to totally eliminate Hamas, the Palestinian suffering would still provide a fertile ground for other radical movements. No wonder the big worry then is that an organised resistance from Hamas and its affiliates could turn this fight into Israel’s long war, impacting the wider region.
DESTROY OR DECAPACITATE
The last time Israel fought a ground war in Gaza for 50 days in 2014, it reduced to rubble large swathes of the Gaza strip, and left more than 70 Israelis and 2,000 Palestinians dead. The current toll surpasses that in just four weeks of intense fighting, while an all-out ground offensive has just about begun. The Hamas attack also underscores how little control Israel had over Gaza strip. It was not just an intelligence failure but a more sweeping strategic failure. Israel’s approach to rely on advanced technology to control the Gaza strip was highly mistaken. Moreover, its decade-long strategy of “mowing the grass” in Gaza has not worked well. Ideally speaking, this time, an IDF campaign limited to the decapacitation of Hamas’ top political and military leadership would be a prudent choice. However, given the horrific scale of the Hamas atrocities, it would be difficult for the Israeli leadership to limit its war objectives to the decimation of Hamas alone. The IDF would seek to avenge the Hamas attack by the scale and scope of its kinetic operations, to destroy Hamas and its infrastructure, and to deter its compatriots from ever mounting such an assault. In the past, Israel has always privileged military scale over scope. Moreover, its counter terrorism approach has been more technology-driven. Possibly, it is time they need to re-think that scope and to introspect on other dimensions of the military conflict such as its international or regional ramifications, and military-cost to sustain the conflict.
FIGHT FOR TUNNELS AND RUBBLE
From a military perspective, three aspects are important.
First, modern militaries are typically organised, equipped and trained to fight terrestrial wars, leaving aside the navies that operate sub-surface. The ground offensive will challenge the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) at two levels: the dense urban landscape and the un-mapped subterranean context. The urban battlescape can be dealt with some difficulty, although Hamas can be expected fight a bitter holding battle in the Gazan rubble. However, the subterranean network would need a unique form of combat, which no land force can claim to have mastery over. Even if the IDF were to have it, the tunnel labyrinth colloquially called the “Gaza Metro” is simply humongous and remains unexplored for any credible military operations. While there are reports of tunnel busting capabilities with the Israelis, and some of it have been claimed over the past few days of fighting, there is no known or proven technology to undertake sustained tunnel-busting operations. The Israeli quest to destroy Hamas’ subterranean lifeline in Gaza will throw up difficult questions on the scope and scale of IDF operations in both contexts.
Second, the urban battle-space will not only be dense and difficult, but the strategic, operational and tactical level military objectives will all be rolled into a single decision space. Bitter tactical battles, where objectives will change hand every now and then, would be the reality. Distinguishing between Hamas cadres and the hapless citizenry would be a challenge, leading to errors in military judgement. While the military strength lies in favour of IDF, however in an urban context fighting ratios hardly matter. Hamas could also draw in cadres from its trans-national allies at a rate higher than IDF’s ability to re-generate reserves. When pushed to the wall, Hamas would resort to loathsome ways of fighting back. Superior technology might help IDF shape a strong cross-domain effect, both kinetic and non-kinetic, but the real challenge would be busting the subterranean network. One can well imagine the battle for the tunnels and rubble of Gaza, where IDF’s technological edge will reduce Hamas’ ability to fight overland, while the Hamas might draw the IDF into bitter and isolated tunnel battles, possibly more gruesome than the trench wars of the twentieth century.
And third, it is possible for Israel to invade and occupy Gaza, but not without destabilizing the region and causing wider conflagration, and an irreparable rift between the West and the rest. Even if they were to succeed and there is no Hamas left, the Palestinians will still look worried at their prospects in West Bank. And if as Palestinians no resistance is offered in Gaza, they literally stand no chance in West Bank. Hamas, or no Hamas, the IDF’s all-out military campaign will only strengthen the Palestinian resolve to fight back and in no way lead to erasure of violence.
IDF’S CHALLENGE
Ever since Hamas took control of Gaza, technology-driven deterrence has not worked for Israel. Every few years violence has erupted in varying frequency and intensity. A billion-dollar wall with hi-tech sensors and its much-famed intelligence services could not deter or detect an audacious Hamas attack. Hi-tech superiority does not always guarantee military advantage against a low-tech adversary. Israel now seeks a “Hamas free” Gaza. Invading Gaza to dismantle Hamas would mean being saddled with millions of hostile people and a daunting task of governing the Gazan territory. Leaving Gaza unaddressed militarily would be an even bigger strategic risk, creating a new enemy to be fought over the next few decades.
The Chief of General Staff for IDF, Lt General Herzi Halevia has spelt out the military objectives of the ground campaign. Dismantling of Hamas, securing the borders and safe return of the hostages being its key objectives. He has predicted a long and risky war. In any case, Hamas will try to survive and remain relevant in the rubble and tunnels of Gaza. This will be the principal military-strategic challenge to Israel.
With the IDF ground offensive having rolled out with full gusto, its leadership will have to continually shape the scope and scale of its military operations to dismantle the Hamas and its infrastructure. There are no easy answers to Israel’s war of necessity, but for its top political and military leadership to find an enduring solution to this vexing issue.
Lt General Harinder Singh (Retd) is former DGMI and Commander 14 Corps during the Eastern Ladakh Crisis of 2020.