Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Tom Tugendhat MP, released their excoriating report ‘Missing in Action’ about the UK’s part in the disastrous withdrawal.
London: The humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal from Afghanistan continues to unfold, the country is on the edge of bankruptcy and epidemic malnutrition, girls are denied education, women are denied jobs, activists are violently suppressed, there have been bombs in Kabul and terrorist groups proliferate; the Taliban continue their ideological stranglehold. The Taliban’s claims of more moderate and secure government have been exposed as pure propaganda, which is what most sentient beings thought all along.
In the midst of all this the Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Tom Tugendhat MP, released their excoriating report “Missing in Action” about the UK’s part in the disastrous withdrawal.
Tugendhat has first-hand operational experience in Afghanistan with the Territorial Army. It is no secret that he has far-reaching political aspirations, and jumps in at every opportunity to criticize the PM and the current modus operandi; in this case, his inquiry is an affirmation of what many have suspected for years, that the FCDO is an immovable monolith that cannot react on a sixpence.
The cross-party Committee identified in the Foreign Office (FCDO) and the National Security Council systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, planning and preparation. The FCDO failed in strategic planning, policymaking and operational management wider than any of the individuals named in the report; they also found a worrying refusal to engage openly with the inquiry. The inquiry received evidence from a broad spectrum including the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, whistle-blowers with a conscience, the Minister responsible for Afghanistan, the FCDO Permanent Under-Secretary, the National Security Adviser, senior civilian and military officials, MPs, experts on Afghanistan and evacuated Afghans.
The report begins with a chronology of events, from Donald Trump’s gruesome agreement in Doha in 2020; despite the 18 months of warning it seems Prime Minster Boris Johnson did not speak with President Biden about Afghanistan until 17 August 2021; to 5 October when the Prime Minister’s High Representative for Afghan Transition, Sir Simon Gass, and Chargé d’Affaires of the UK Mission to Afghanistan in Doha, Dr Martin Longden, travelled to Afghanistan to hold talks with senior Taliban officials.
The Committee found the UK Government failed to take seriously the Trump Administration’s decision, or the domestic pressures that lay behind it, hoping that the US might change their mind or delay departure. The government failed to prepare for the consequences of the withdrawal, there was a pervasive atmosphere of “optimism bias” and “wishful thinking” across officials and the political leadership of the FCDO and the Government. The UK and NATO partners made only limited attempts to shape Washington’s decision by convincing it to remain, or to leave enough troops to prevent collapse of the Afghan government. These inadequate attempts fell flat and according to the New York Times point to a worrying lack of British influence in Washington.
Even after twenty years of engagement in Afghanistan, the report finds serious gaps in the UK’s understanding of political, cultural and military aspects within Afghanistan, which Rory Stewart, former International Development Secretary and serious Afghanistan old hand, describes as a “rottenness at the heart of the British Foreign Office”. The big questions are why was the rapid collapse not anticipated and why was UK intelligence so basic? The FCDO will not explain why the Lessons Learned Review only covers the period from April 2021 onwards, and why does it not cover intelligence matters?
The report lists a catalogue of failures, from no plan for the evacuation of UK nationals, or Afghans who worked for the UK Government and vulnerable Afghans who had supported UK objectives; no plan for the embassy shut down or the disposal of personal data, and no plans for exit routes via third countries. There is a detailed section questioning the process for the evacuation of a Kabul animal charity named Nowzad, whose British founder left Kabul with the animals on 28 August as the only passenger on a 230-seat private aircraft, after his staff were unable to enter the airport.
It seems government departments worked in silos and the National Security Council failed to bring all the departments together; FCDO, MOD, intelligence agencies, Home Office and Cabinet Office should all have been inputting and coordinating efforts for the government’s objectives for national security. Decisions were slowed down because when the Taliban took Kabul, the Prime Minister, the then-Foreign Secretary, the Minister responsible for Afghanistan, and the FCDO’s top civil servant, Sir Philip Barton, were all on holiday, it seems no leadership cover was in place. The decision to withdraw diplomatic staff from the Kabul embassy was a mistake, a Minister said this cost the evacuation effort “several days”, with between 800 and 1,000 fewer people evacuated as a result. The Committee found “the fact that the department’s top civil servant did not return until the civilian evacuation was over, while staff across the department struggled to implement a poorly-planned evacuation process under intense pressure, is difficult to understand and impossible to excuse.”
Evidently there was no direction, no leadership, arbitrary prioritisation, bureaucratic chaos and no expertise on Afghanistan. Consequently, those who believed UK had a responsibility to protect were let down. It was found the FCDO demonstrated a lack of transparency and accountability, during evasive and misleading replies they have attempted to pass the buck of responsibility to other departments.
The Committee found FCDO’s approach appears to have been guided more by domestic politics than by its duty to Afghan partners, or by the UK’s wider geopolitical interests. Yet following the Taliban takeover, the Government announced a doubling in aid to Afghanistan to £286 million in 2021/2, and has pledged to match this in 2022/3.
Domestic politics is a key couple of words here, compare the careless and haphazard approach to leaving Afghanistan to UK’s intervention in and support for Ukraine, where domestic politics and foreign policy overlap.