A spatial conflict spillover is centred around the idea that a conflict in one area can affect areas far
away from its epicentre, in areas that are not contiguous.
In a curious turn of events, the Houthis in Yemen willingly joined Hamas in the Israel-Hamas war that
has been going on for over a month. This classic case of spatial conflict spillover is not the first to
occur in the Middle East. At its peak, the Syrian civil war attracted a lot of foreign fighters, primarily
motivated by religious ideologies. However, what is different this time is that the Houthis, who
themselves have been embroiled in a conflict for the past decade, have decided to stretch their agenda
and resources to help their “Palestinian brothers” in Gaza. This move demands the question: why?
A spatial conflict spillover is centred around the idea that a conflict in one area can affect areas far
away from its epicentre, in areas that are not contiguous. While the common aspects of spatial conflict
spillover (SCS) that strike first are the impact on trade and refugee flux, SCS can also drive
ideological diffusion, mobilising sympathisers from another area and even leading to military
interventions. This is the case with the Houthis in Yemen.
The armed conflict that has been lingering since 2014 has left much of the state dysfunctional, with
mounting civilian deaths and resource degradation. After multiple attempts, the peace talks that began
in September between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia seemed like the best chance in years for an end
to fighting in Yemen. Riyadh took a step ahead, calling the Houthis “Sana’a delegation”, a recognition
that had never been given previously. Nonetheless, with the Houthis entering the war in Gaza, the
house of cards that is being built for peace by the UN in Yemen will be disturbed. Around the same
time as the first attack on Israel from Yemen, some Houthi fighters also clashed with Saudi forces
near the Kingdom’s border, endangering the confidence that was brewing between the two parties in
the past few months.
WHY ARE THE HOUTHIS GETTING INVOLVED?
The flag of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement reads the slogan, “God is greater than everything;
Death to America; Death to Israel; Curse upon the Jews; Victory to Islam”. The leaders adopted this
from a similar slogan propagated during the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Much of the antagonistic
perception of the US arose in 2001 when the superpower dragged Yemen into its war on terrorism.
Falling short of a full-blown invasion like in the case of Iraq or Afghanistan, the US’ unilateral
bombardment of what they considered as Al Qaeda havens and holding the Yemeni government under
its thumb led to a rebel movement that has persisted so long to sustain an armed conflict against a
coalition of Gulf powers and the West. Along with this, the Palestinian cause has continued to be
primordial for Yemen, particularly the Iran-backed Houthis. They have years of historical sentiments
enough to drive them to join the war.
Furthermore, Arab societies, especially ones that are more tribal, function on the basis of honour and
shame. Arabs habitually require extensive conformity from those close to them. This conformity earns
honour, social prestige, and a secure societal spot. The person who conforms to the group has the
advantage of being backed by all those in his group, even if it means attacking “outsiders” to protect
one’s own. Such is the power of social identity in Arab society.
The Yemeni society is primarily tribal. Honour and shame within the Yemeni culture are closely
linked to territorial control and the defence of one’s family, tribe, and community. Battle losses or
territorial control may be seen as a forfeiture of honour. This is construed as inviting community
members who lost their honour to attack and re-establish honour. The tribal Arab society is known for
holding three aspects cardinal to its functioning: honour, shame and revenge. Peace is only secondary
to this trio. Individuals or groups must strive to avoid shame or avenge to regain honour. Therefore,
peace has been a very fragile aspect for the Yemenis, who are part of tribal confederations; honour
and shame influence individual and group behaviours, which has been the case in Yemen throughout
history.
Such expressions of honour can be observed in the statements of various Yemeni political actors after
the Houthi attack on Israel. An authority from the Southern Movement expressed that “this ‘heroic’
operation restored the nation’s ‘glory’ and status”. Another local official from the Taiz governorate
took “pride in the Yemeni armed forces carrying out their duty based on religious, moral and
humanitarian responsibility.” Moaz Abu Shamala, Hamas representative in Yemen, also said that
Yemen’s participation “will be recorded in history on its brightest pages, especially in light of the state
of Arab helplessness and failure.”
This is one of the many occasions when society’s honour was questioned much of the Yemeni
population stood in solidarity, holding back the domestic rifts. Despite the hardships that Yemen has
been reeling under since the war began, putting aside the progress made so far through peace talks,
several circles of the society have chosen to endanger stability and security by fighting for Palestine to
restore honour. The implications could be rampant.
WHAT IS IN STORE FOR YEMEN?
For starters, Yemen runs the risk of a counter-attack by Israel or the United States. The Houthi armed
wing is equipped with several ballistic and cruise missiles and drones with a range to hit parts of
South Israel. They can effectively hit strategic locations in Israel, including the port of Eilat. For
example, the Quds missiles (referred to as Paveh by Iran) have a range of 1,650 km that can hit
southern Israel if not intercepted. As was demonstrated recently, the Houthis also have a series of
drones that have the endurance to reach Israel and cause damage. Apart from this, they have other
missiles with similar or more ranges, a fact well-known as the Houthis do not shy away from
exhibiting them in their military parades. The Houthis, under the National Campaign in Support of Al-
Aqsa, are determined to provide sincere backing to Hamas. Hence, the possibility of retaliation from
Israel or its allies in the war, mainly from the Red Sea, cannot be taken off the table. Such a
predicament can guarantee the further loss of lives and infrastructure in Yemen.
What will follow is an aggravated humanitarian crisis, only portending more chaos and disorder in the
war-torn state. The Presidential Council has not openly given a green signal to Houthi operations
targeting Israel. As the internationally-recognised representative of the Yemeni government, the
Council’s unattachment to the Houthi campaign while supporting the Palestinian cause could be the
Council playing safe to get into firefighting mode in case the campaign backfires. Second, the
addition of parties to the existing conflict could further complicate the situation, making it difficult to
reach a negotiated settlement in the foreseeable future. Third, the disorder can once again lead to the
recreation of breeding grounds for terrorist outfits like AQAP or the reinvigoration of secessionist
tendencies. Any of these conditions mean Yemen, an already war-hit, impoverished and fragmented
state, could be spiralling back into active armed conflict. There is much in store for Yemen, but they
are hardly meritorious.
B. Poornima is a Junior Resrearch Fellow (UGC-NET) and doctoral candidate at the Department of
Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India. Twitter:
@aminroopb