Pune: The degradation of Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies has changed the strategic equations of the Middle East, perhaps for the better.
Over the past few months, the standard refrain in Israeli media has been the impending war with the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel has been preparing for war with its major adversary, the Hezbollah, ever since the Gaza war broke out and the two sides had been trading fire on a daily basis for almost a year now. And although the world has tried to stave off the wider war in the Middle East, it seems that the Hezbollah moment has now arrived.
When Israel attacked Gaza last year, it was more a knee-jerk reaction to attain retribution for the horrific 7 October attacks, and seemed to lack a cohesive well-defined military strategy. Perhaps that is why the war has gone on for over a year with no clear end state in sight. But that war gave Israel the time to refine its strategy against the Hezbollah, which it now seems to be following with devastating effect.
Had Israel attacked Southern Lebanon in much the same manner that they did Gaza, it may have resulted in a bloody stalemate. Perhaps that is what the Hezbollah hoped for when they launched the almost daily provocations into Israel. With its 100,000 well-armed and motivated fighters and arsenal of over 150,000 rockets and missiles, it would have been a tough nut to crack. But the manner in which the Israel has gone about degrading the Hezbollah, by incapacitating its leadership, breaking its chain of command and cutting off their communication, has left it leaderless and vulnerable before Israel’s anticipated ground offensive.
Israel has to be complimented—if only from a purely military viewpoint—for the manner in which it decimated the Hezbollah leadership. Air and missile attacks had eliminated some top ranking leaders over the past few months, but the clinching moment came at 3.30 pm on 17 September, when pagers used by its leaders exploded simultaneously, killing 12 and injuring another 600. The very next day another set of explosions at the funeral of dead Hezbollah cadres, detonated walkie talkies and solar panels, killing 25 and injuring another 2,400. This Trojan Horse operation used Hassan Nasrallah’s fear of mobile phones and his recent diktat to Hezbollah cadres to switch to old fashioned pagers to avoid detection. The Israelis seem to have anticipated that and had already set up a front company in Budapest to manufacture pagers on behalf of the Gold Apollo firm of Taiwan—which had received the order for 5,000 pagers by Hezbollah. This order was executed with a difference. The batteries of these pagers were laced with 2-3 grams of PETM, designed to explode at a given signal. That signal came at 3:30 PM on 17 September when a message ostensibly sent by the top leadership itself, set of the explosions and killed or incapacitated the Hezbollah leadership from the local rank of colonel upwards. The coup de grace came 10 days later, when an Israeli air strike hit the headquarters of Hassan Nasrallah himself in a building in central Beirut. Over eighty 2,000 pounder bombs—including the deadly bunker busters—ripped through the six-storey building, penetrated the underground bunker and killed Nasrallah and the Hezbollah leaders there—which included the Southern front commander Ali Karaki, head of its elite Radwan Force, Ibrahim Aqil and the missile force commander Ibrahim Qubaisi. Since then, Israel has systematically targeted the Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi leadership in targets as far off as Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and have hit virtually the entire top leadership, crippling their chain of command and communication. It was a prelude to the main operations to follow.
A GROUND WAR?
Israel and the Hezbollah (literally, “The Party of God”) have had quite a symbiotic relationship. Ironically, Israel helped create the Hezbollah during their needless invasion of Lebanon in 1982. That invasion hurled Lebanon into chaos and led to the rise of Hezbollah which soon took over the once prosperous and thriving country.
When Israel attacked Lebanon again in 2006, the resultant stalemate was touted as a victory by the Hezbollah and raised its stock considerably. Even now, as Israel-Hezbollah tensions ratcheted after the Gaza War, it seemed to be preparing for a long ground war in which they hoped to halt the IDF in a similar stalemate. But Israeli actions have already defanged it and reduced its ability to fight a coordinated defensive battle.
Netanyahu had provided a clue as to what would follow, when he amended his war aims to include “the return of Israeli settlers to the northern areas.” Hezbollah firing had forced the evacuation of over 60,000 Israeli settlers from the areas adjoining Southern Lebanon. They can only return if Hezbollah capabilities to fire into these areas is eliminated, and for that an area almost 30 km deep inside Southern Lebanon has to be cleared. Israel has redeployed its elite 98th Division from Gaza and the 76th Division to the Northern Front, building up a force of around 70,000 troops. Commando raids in Southern Lebanon—a favoured Israeli tactic before operations—have begun, and the first incursions have gone in. This could be the start of the ground offensive in Southern Lebanon which could move up to the line of the Litani River 30-40 km deep and eliminate the missile and rocket batteries deployed there. The area could become a “Buffer Zone” and later be used for fresh settlements in keeping with the standard Israeli playbook it has followed in earlier wars. But, in spite of the loss of its leadership and breakdown of communications, Hezbollah is still a formidable force. Israel lost eight soldiers in the first two days itself and as it goes deeper will have to fight an increasingly difficult battle in the valleys, villages and broken area which favours the defender. The task would not be easy, but seems increasingly doable.
The response in the Arab world has been quite subdued. Hassan Nasrallah’s death evoked howls of street protests but the Saudis, Egypt and UAE have barely commented. In fact the degradation of Hamas, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies has changed the strategic equations of the Middle East, perhaps for the better. That is why, in spite of all odds, the Abraham Accord is holding and Israel retains its acceptance in the Arab world.
Iran has responded with its usual wave of missile and rocket strikes on Israel, but it seems largely ineffectual. Iran is in a bind. It cannot remain silent as its proxies are eliminated, but should it respond, it will bring upon retaliation—not just by Israel but by the US as well, which has already moved ships and troops to the region—including a third aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. It is quite likely that the Israeli actions are part of a strategy to draw Iran into the war, and then use the excuse to deliver well-timed blows to remove the Iranian leadership, eliminate its nuclear program, and perhaps use this turmoil to rouse the Iranian people. It is significant that Netanyahu himself emphasised that the battle is not with the Iranians but their leaders, saying, “The people of Iran should know—Israel stands with you,”—a statement indicative of the long-term aim of Israel and the US—regime change. But Iran is being pushed against the wall and its reaction could be unpredictable and dangerous.
Israel has become increasingly defiant of world opinion and its recent battlefield successes have further emboldened it. It has categorically refused the offer of a “21-day ceasefire,” shrugged off UNGA resolution calling it to vacate its “occupied territories” and even banned entry of the UN Chief Antonio Guterres into its territory. Netanyahu’s defiant speech at the UNGA (made almost the same time that Operation New Order, the attacks on Nasrallah were being launched) made it clear that Israel would not stop till it attains its aim of long-term security. This implies that elimination of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and all other proxies operating against them—and then Iran itself, or rather the regime in Iran. Israel’s Hezbollah moment has arrived but it remains to be seen whether that would truly attain its long term security or whether the cycle of violence would simply perpetuate itself in another form.
Ajay Singh is the international award winning author of seven books, including “Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan…A World at War.” He is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian. Israel’s Hezbollah moment