The possibility of collusion from within the establishment in Pakistan creates a grave risk of Pakistani terrorist organisations gaining access to nuclear weapons, components or technical knowhow.
NEW DELHI: Over the last few years, Pakistan has been in the grip of terrorist violence, with increasingly brazen attacks by terrorists on national assets and security forces, with the latest such instance being the hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the Baloch Liberation Army on March 11, 2025. Meanwhile, with soaring inflation, mounting external debt and rock-bottom foreign reserves, Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits. Notwithstanding all this, one front where Pakistan is relentlessly gaining ground and progressing well is in the field of enhancing its nuclear arsenal on the pretext of deterrence. In an increasingly dangerous security environment, fragile economic situation and weak governance, the security of these strategic assets may prove to be a liability to the very survival of the military-controlled state that is Pakistan.
PAKISTAN’S GROWING ARSENAL AND ESCALATING EXPENDITURE
Pakistan’s nuclear expansion persists unabated. The country has been aggressively producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for its nuclear program and stockpiling fissile material. As per a report by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, in September 2023, Pakistan had approximately 170 nuclear warheads, which could increase to over 200 by the end of 2025 at the current rate. It is a paradox that the growth rate of nuclear warheads in Pakistan seems much higher and healthier than that of its economy at 2.4%. As per varying estimates, Pakistan’s annual expenditure on maintaining its nuclear arsenal ranges from approximately $1 billion to $2.2 billion. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) reported that in 2019, Pakistan allocated around $1 billion to its nuclear weapons program, equating to roughly $1,924 spent every minute. Along with stockpiling nuclear weapons, Pakistan, to maintain a credible deterrence, has to sustain a diverse array of delivery systems to include:
* Nuclear-capable aircraft: US-built F-16A/B and French-manufactured Mirage III and Mirage V, which have been modified for nuclear weapons delivery. JF-17 in the near future may also be equipped with nuclear capable Ra’ad I missile.
* Ballistic missiles in Operation: Short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I (Hatf-4), and medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5), Shaheen-II (Hatf-6), and Shaheen-III (Hatf-6). The Nasr (Hatf-9) is a dual-capable short-range missile for battlefield use.
* Cruise missiles in operation: Ground-launched Babur-1 (Haft-7) and air-launched Ra’ad (Haft-8).
A nation surviving on the twin crutches of IMF bailout and doles from Saudi Arabia, beset with increasing internal militancy and political volatility, is now burdened with the responsibility of maintaining and securing one of the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenals and delivery means.
AN UNSTABLE FOUNDATION
Nuclear weapons require absolute command and control and impenetrable security, but in Pakistan, this foundation is far from solid. Most of the country’s nuclear sites, originally built with the intention of keeping them away from the perceived aggressor India, are concentrated in politically fragile regions—Wah, Fatehjang, Kahuta, and Taxila. Many of these sites have been targeted by terrorist attacks over the past two decades. The proximity of nuclear infrastructure to militant strongholds is not just an operational risk but a national catastrophe waiting to happen.
In 2013, the Washington Post, quoting the secret documents provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden, revealed that the Director of US National Intelligence had warned that “knowledge of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and associated material encompassed one of the most critical set of… intelligence gaps”. He flagged this as a concern, “given the political instability, terrorist threats and expanding inventory [of nuclear weapons] in that country”. These apprehensions are hardly unfounded. Between 2007 and 2012, there were at least six documented attacks on nuclear assets linked sites:
* In November 2007, a suicide attack killed seven Pakistani military personnel who were travelling between Mushaf Mir Airbase and the Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha—both the places being associated with the nuclear programme of Pakistan.
* In August 2008, a twin bomb killed 64 people in Wah cantonment. One of the explosions is believed to have taken place outside the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), which houses the Gadwal Enrichment Plant.
* In July 2009, a bus carrying Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) workers was attacked by a suicide bomber at Choor Chowk, Peshawar Road. KRL is a federally funded research and development laboratory known for its role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
* In October 2009, Kamra’s Minhas Air Force Base, widely assessed to host Pakistani nuclear weapons, was attacked. The attacker had detonated a bomb at “a checkpoint on a road leading to the complex”.
* In December 2010, militants attacked a Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) school bus in Kamra. PAC has also been associated with the country’s nuclear programme. In August 2012, the Minhas Air Force Base was attacked again. This time, the attackers gained access to the air base, damaging one aircraft.
* In the year 2023, Pakistan recorded an extraordinary spike in terrorism-related activities, with the total violence-related fatalities reaching a six-year high. “According to the annual security report by the Islamabad-based CRSS, at least 1,524 violence-related casualties and 1,463 injuries from 789 terror attacks and counter-terror operations were recorded in Pakistan in 2023.”
These attacks highlight the persistent security challenges that the state of Pakistan has been facing for years. It is indicative of a systemic failure of the state security apparatus and weak institutions unable to provide security to its populace or to its assets. In such a fragile security environment, Pakistan’s nuclear assets could be at a relative risk of falling into the hands or being damaged by the extremist elements.
A THREAT FROM WITHIN
The possibility of collusion from within the establishment in Pakistan creates a graver risk of Pakistani terrorist organisations gaining access to nuclear weapons, components or technical knowhow. Over the last few decades, very many institutions entrusted with safeguarding nuclear weapons have become progressively more vulnerable to “ideological porosity”. There is a strong anti-Western sentiment within the Pakistani Army and the ISI, with overlapping radicalised strands and extremist sympathies. Technocrats with pro-terrorist or anti-Western leanings transferring their knowledge to the terrorist organisations is a live threat which has reared its ugly head time and again in Pakistan.
In one instance, “two senior scientists of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Sultan Bashirrudin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, had traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 and again just before 9/11 for meetings with Osama bin Ladin. The details of these meetings were never disclosed”, (Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, Nuclear Jihadist: The Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Weapons, New York: Twelve, 2007). The exploits of the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Dr A.Q. Khan, who was arrested in 2004 for organising the world’s largest nuclear proliferation network, have been well documented.
Such incidents do not add to the confidence and points to the permeability and real risk in Pakistan’s context, of the nuclear technology being sold to terrorist organisations in the black market. It may be interesting to recall the instance when the former Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, was apparently instrumental in passing nuclear weapons technology to Iran in the 1980s, simply for money for the Pakistan Army. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that under certain circumstances, even senior figures in the Pakistan Army may be willing to transfer nuclear weapons technology if adequate motivation or incentive exists. The idea that rogue factions within the military or other sensitive establishments—whether driven by ideology or resentment—could one day compromise nuclear security is not far-fetched as deep collusion between the elements of Pakistan’s top security establishments and global jihadist networks is a documented fact.
Furthermore, as Pakistan’s political landscape deteriorates, the potential for nuclear miscalculation increases. A fragile government, military factions vying for control, and a leadership with a history of reckless decision-making portend that the risk of a nuclear confrontation—either intentional or accidental—is not an abstraction but a looming possibility.
CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILING STATE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A country that cannot guarantee its own political stability, economic viability, security to its citizens or territorial integrity can hardly be trusted with the responsibility of managing the safety of its nuclear arsenal.
The probability of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of non-state actors—whether through internal decay, state collapse, or theft—is no longer a theoretical scenario but a genuine strategic nightmare. This could lead to nuclear technology and/or materials being smuggled to rogue states or terrorist organisations, triggering regional destablisations, military escalations and crisis at an unprecedented global scale.
While the Pakistan government has assured the international community about the safety of its nuclear assets, the evolving security landscape and the empirical evidence tell a different story. There are serious vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security arrangements, raising legitimate concerns about their security. US President Joe Biden, at a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee reception in October 2022, commented that Pakistan was “one of the most dangerous nations in the world” because of the lack of “cohesion” in its nuclear security and command and control procedures—a comment that Pakistan quickly and forcefully rebuked (Al Jazeera: 15 Oct 2022, Indian Express: 16 Oct 2022). If left unchecked, these challenges could pose a serious threat not only to Pakistan but to global security at large.
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A SUICIDE PACT IN THE MAKING
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine was built on the premise that its arsenal would deter Indian aggression. In reality, it has become a slow-acting poison, eroding Pakistan’s security rather than ensuring it. The country is arming itself for a war it cannot win against threats it cannot control while its internal disintegration accelerates. The paradox of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is that its greatest deterrent is now its most significant liability. With every new warhead added to its stockpile, Pakistan inches closer not to strategic supremacy but to self-destruction.
The world must acknowledge that Pakistan’s nuclear crisis is not just about regional security—it is about the survival of Pakistan itself. A failing Pakistani state with nuclear weapons would not only threaten regional security but also pose a grave global risk. The international community must closely monitor Pakistan’s political and economic
* Maj Gen. Deepak Mehra (Retd) is a distinguished Indian Army Veteran and former Indian Military Attaché in Moscow, specialising in strategic affairs with an extensive focus on Russia. He can be reached at deepakmehra67@yahoo.co.uk