Reality of CCP nightmare of a close security partnership between US and India would deter rather than incentivise PLA adventurism on the border with India.
From its rejuvenation under Prime Minister Modi and President Trump in 2017, ten years after it was formed on the suggestion of Japanese PM Shinzo Abe in 2007, the Quad has implicitly ruled out any role in a kinetic conflict. Such a prohibition includes military action to meet any kinetic challenge from the country that was in the crosshairs of the Abe concept, China. Interestingly, the Doklam clash between India and China happened in 2017, and yet despite the clash highlighting the obvious need for security against kinetic attacks through such an alliance, India has remained firm that mutual assistance against kinetic conflicts with China continue to remain outside the purview of the Quad. In the same way, India has remained opposed to any addition to the existing Quad members, despite having consented to the BRICS Plus at the Johannesburg summit of the BRICS countries, which group itself was increased by the addition of South Africa to the original four members of BRICS, which were India, the US, Japan and Australia. And it would be pertinent to recall that India succeeded in adding the African Union to the G-20 in the 2023 New Delhi Summit. Prime Minister Modi, in tandem with the concerned ministers, is known for his innovative policies, which is why there is confidence amongst his well-wishers that the blossoming of the Quad into a comprehensive security mechanism, including in the kinetic sphere, would take place during Modi 3.0. Information being fed to the highest echelons of power need to be focused on accuracy, and not get transformed through the lens of political or other processes. In 1962, in much the same way as was the case with the Pakistani occupation of the Kargil heights in 1999, the use of air power would have transformed the situation facing the country because of the Chinese invasion. The Air Force was not used in the 1962 war not just because of the pacifist instincts of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru but because the PM was given an exaggerated assessment of the Chinese air force, which was rudimentary at the time. A warning was given by the IB that if we were to use the Indian Air Force to interdict PLA forces, the response would be for the PLA to launch severe air attacks on Kolkata and on cities across the Indo-Tibet border, something for which the PLA Air Force lacked the capability at the time. Intelligence chief B.N. Mullick had, just before the Chinese attack, briefed Nehru that “the Chinese would never attack India”, information that had been picked up from individuals who had been influenced by the Chinese in Kalimpong, a hotbed of such activities at the time. It needs to be mentioned that even when an intelligence agency believes that the best case would come about, it needs to simultaneously prepare worst case scenarios and how to deal with them, a requirement not always met in their reports.
Old habits linger on, and to this day there are officials who believe that China will never (again) attack India. Indeed, scholars of the calibre of Kishor Mahbubani have opined that the PRC would not even attack Taiwan. Such a camouflaging of actual intentions often is part of the preparatory planning for just such an attack, something that President Lai Ching-te would be fully aware of, given the detailed preparations which he is making for such an attack. Given the formidable security quartet of Union Home Minister Amit Shah, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar, Finance Minister Sitharaman and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, it is clear that Prime Minister Narendra Modi fully realises the danger from the east, which is why he is intensifying the building of infrastructure at the India-Tibet border and training military personnel to configure for defensive operations. Out of ten lines of approach, nine need to focus on deterrence, and the best available way to ensure such deterrence is a mutual security pact between the Quad members. At the same time, the outer ring of such defences includes the Philippines, which is why close ties need to be built with Manila. Dealing with Trump 2.0 is very different from the way matters were dealt with during Trump 1.0, in which he was surrounded by Cabinet members who were intent on sabotaging his initiatives rather than carrying them out. He is free of such constraints now, although he still appears to harbour the illusion that he can “cut a deal with China”. The reality is that the establishment in Beijing regards President Trump as the principal obstacle to their efforts at displacing the US as the Numero Uno in the international order, in the process weakening the US dollar and weakening the population, chiefly through manipulation of messaging through social media. A comparison of the difference in tone and content between Tik Tok in the US and Europe compared with that in Dou Yin, the PRC substitute for Tik Tok, would illustrate this point. Drug addiction, smartphone addiction and other societal fault lines in Europe and the US are representative of what is happening in Europe and the US during the 21st century. Building a strong security relationship with the US is the most effective buffer mitigating the effects of policies of President Trump that are less than helpful to India. It has often been argued that such a partnership would be met with a strong riposte from China. The reality is that the CCP leadership comprises of individuals who only respect power, and while the bluster may multiply for some time, the reality of the CCP nightmare of a close security partnership between the US and India would deter rather than incentivise PLA adventurism on the border with India. Given the focus on the Indo-Pacific and China of the NSA, FBI, CIA and DNI in the Trump Presidency, they would be looking at establishing such a security relationship with India in order that New Delhi becomes perhaps the most important partner in the Indo-Pacific. To ensure that, concessions that need to be made will be made to accommodate Indian concerns. At the same time, good relations with the EU and the UK would be facilitated by innovative ideas such as the India Middle East Europe Corridor, once the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts get settled in the manner desired by the White House in the first, and a consensus solution reached between Israel and the GCC in the case of the other. As remains the case with Canada, the EU remains a key partner of India.