Marco Rubio implied that Trump 2.0 is poised to reshape the notion that it is better to be America’s enemy than its friend. In that case, the US will find no better partner than India.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has returned from his first engagement with Trump 2.0. Beyond the usual takeaways from the joint statement, which have been widely covered, certain messaging stands out, which would shape the India-US relations under Modi-Trump.
First, President Donald Trump reaffirmed that he means business—quite literally. “Show me the money” could well be the motto of Trump 2.0. This approach is not necessarily disadvantageous for India. As a rapidly growing economy with rising demands, India is well-positioned to offer deals to the US if it stands to benefit in other aspects. For example, in my article on this bilateral meeting published in The Sunday Guardian on 9 February, I discussed the potential of importing more liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is reflected in the joint statement, where both nations agreed “to establish the United States as a leading supplier of crude oil and petroleum products and liquefied natural gas to India.” The US is currently the second-largest supplier, with Qatar holding the top spot. For India, engaging with a leader focused on securing better deals is far easier than navigating ideological agendas.
Second, just before meeting PM Modi, Trump announced global reciprocal tariffs. He pointedly mentioned India’s high tariffs in his press statement—with the PM standing beside him. He did not give a special welcome or a send-off to PM Modi, nor did he receive him at the White House. He twice dismissed questions about India’s potential role in brokering peace between Russia and Ukraine, instead emphasising China’s role. He also offered to mediate in Indo-China skirmishes, disregarding the fact that his earlier offer to mediate with Pakistan during Trump 1.0 was not well received by India. Yet, Trump’s approach was not entirely tough, dismissive, or insensitive. In the Oval Office, he pulled and pushed back the chair for the PM, refrained from imposing immediate tariffs or singling out India as he did with China, Canada, and Mexico, and agreed to highlight the economic contributions of over 300,000 Indian students in the joint statement despite a section of his support base having engaged in racist online attacks on Indians. He avoided making a fuss about Iran, which would have drawn attention to Chabahar port, allowing the issue to quietly take a back seat as India works it out with the US, like it did during Trump 1.0. When an American journalist asked PM Modi about Biden’s “incompetence and weakness,” Trump took it upon himself to respond—not as an opportunity to criticise the Biden Administration, which he did, but to spare the Indian PM from having to answer. In the joint statement, the US appreciated India’s role as a developmental, humanitarian assistance and “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean Region. He also handed Modi a win by announcing the extradition of Tahawwur Rana, wanted for the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. This blow hot-blow cold approach will continue, but overall, Trump is likely to give India more leeway and occasional wins.
Third, PM Modi was friendly towards Trump, not warm. He made all the right gestures and utterances, but as someone who has closely studied Modi and his governance, it was apparent to me that he was distant—or perhaps, cautious. It is worth remembering that during the general elections, Modi spoke about foreign interference in Indian elections, and two months ago, the BJP accused USAID, funded by the US State Department, of being linked to deep state elements aiming to destabilise India. Having invested in strengthening the Indo-US relationship
Fourth, the Indian side succeeded in getting the US to agree to “aggressively” tackle illegal immigration and human trafficking, and to “take decisive action against illegal immigration networks, organised crime syndicates, including narco-terrorists, human and arms traffickers, as well as other elements who threaten public and diplomatic safety and security, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both nations.” Trump is eager to present himself as a “law and order” President, and appears disinterested in using separatists, criminals, or extremists as leverage. As such, the Khalistani extremists operating from the US, who are involved in all of the above illegal activities, are likely to face increased scrutiny.
Fifth, Trump does not seem inclined to invest his energy in Bangladesh or Pakistan and will be content if India handles them. He seems willing to strengthen India’s position through remarks, such as the mention of Pakistan as a terror hub for cross-border attacks in the joint statement, or his open-to-interpretation comment, “I will leave Bangladesh to the Prime Minister.” His statement that “the United States and India will be working together like never before to confront the threat of radical Islamic terrorism” should also be viewed in this context. With Trump in DC, the freezing of foreign funding, and the ongoing dismantling of USAID, US interference in Bangladesh has been largely neutralised. Trump’s commitment to remove deep state elements, including figures like George Soros, will further mitigate concerns. His negative stance towards Mohammad Yunus, his South Asia appointee’s view of Pakistan as a uniquely dangerous state, and his Secretary of State’s positive position on India—overall a net gain for India vis-à-vis the subcontinent.
Sixth, President Trump views India and PM Modi as friends, but not as equals. As hard as it may be to accept, this is the uncomfortable truth—we are not in the same league. Not yet. Trump does not perceive India as a threat; rather, he sees it as a rising power that will provide business opportunities, strengthen the US position in the Indo-Pacific, and not become a liability like some of America’s other allies. From Modi’s perspective, US non-interference, along with the indirect benefits gained from Trump’s inward focus, are of significant value. One seeks money, the other seeks strategic advantages and global footprint—both are driven by a desire to leave a legacy and will gladly contribute to make each other great again, as long as it aligns with their interests. The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in a 13 February opinion piece, “America First does not mean America Alone.” He implied that Trump 2.0 is poised to reshape the notion that it is better to be America’s enemy than its friend. In that case, the US will find no better partner than India.
To conclude, if I understand Narendra Modi—and I believe I have a better grasp than most analysts—this visit will ignite a fire within him to take India to the greater heights he envisions. Making India a world leader is not a mere “jumla” for him. It is a driving force behind his political journey. A reality check from POTUS that India, while important, is not yet in the league, and the fact that he has limited time, will push PM Modi to shift into top gear, shedding the election-centric approach of his party. In my opinion, that will be the best outcome of his US visit as far as India is concerned.
* Semu Bhatt is a strategic adviser, author, and founder of FuturisIndia.