Reed Chevrin offers a comprehensive narrative that situates the conflict within the broader context of Cold War politics and regional dynamics.
New Delhi: Reed Chevrin’s The Cold War in the Himalayas provides an insightful and meticulously researched account of the geopolitical intricacies surrounding the Sino-Indian border conflict between 1950 and 1970. By weaving together multinational perspectives, Chevrin offers a comprehensive narrative that extends beyond the India-China binary, situating the conflict within the broader context of Cold War politics and regional dynamics.
What sets The Cold War in the Himalayas apart is that Chevrin draws from declassified documents, diplomatic correspondence, and first-hand accounts from the Anglophone countries, provincial archives in China and the Academia Historica in Taiwan. Documents accessed from Beijing Municipal archives reveal that some Chinese people believed the war squandered resources; and that going to war with India needlessly placed China in danger; while some pitied the withdrawal of the PLA to the north of the McMahon Line, others argued that “it effectively recognised the legality of the boundary” (pp.54-55). These opinions, though remained overshadowed by the propaganda in the official media, nonetheless, provided a differing perspective from the Chinese citizens. One of the sources quoted from the Academia Historica says how 125 members of the Indian parliament signed a petition advising the Indian government to break diplomatic relations with Beijing and recognise the Republic of China (pp.211, 213). Obviously, the Republic of China deemed India a key part of its plan to retake Mainland China (p. 216), but on the question of territory Republic of China’s views didn’t differ from the Mainland.
One of the book’s greatest strengths is its use of multinational perspectives to contextualize the Cold War battleground during the 1950s and 1960s. Chevrin skilfully illustrates how various powers especially the Anglophone countries viewed the conflict as both a regional dispute and a chess piece in the larger Cold War game. While “the US used Tibet to antagonise People’s Republic”, the British “tried to persuade the US not to mount resistance” as was its case at the UN, Australia and New Zealand merely observed happenings in Tibet, they refrained from provoking China as they feared it would worsen the security situation even though all deemed the Himalayan states vulnerable to Chinese subversion (p. 189). In the aftermath of the war, perspectives ranging from the US’ recognition of the McMahon Line, the Soviet Union trying to negotiate a policy of equidistance, and the commonwealth solidarity with India minus Canada’s reluctance are refreshing accounts. Chevrin deftly explains how the Sino-Indian war of 1962 became a flashpoint that underscored the limitations of non-alignment as a policy, as well as the fragility of international alliances. The analysis of the aftermath—particularly the shifts in Indian foreign policy and the deepening Sino-Pakistani ties—adds depth to the narrative.
Chevrin avoids oversimplification, acknowledging the complex motivations on both sides of the Sino-Indian border. He explores how historical grievances, ideological differences, and territorial ambitions fuelled tensions, particularly in the contested regions of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. His balanced narrative ensures that both Indian and Chinese perspectives are presented with equal rigor, making the book an invaluable resource for understanding the roots of the conflict. According to Chevrin, from the Chinese perspective, “India disrespected Chinese sovereignty and regarded Tibet as a quasi-protectorate”; Nehru’s “laissez-faire attitude towards the Dalai Lama’s activities” and Indian troop movement towards the McMahon Line after China’s invasion of Tibet in 1951 were deemed as India’s “attempts to invade Tibet” by the People’s Republic (pp. 126, 130-31). India on the other hand saw Chinese invasion of Tibet as a “policy of expanding frontiers”, increasing its influence in India’s defence arc—Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Burma, and isolate these from India (pp.162-63). He avoids the nature of China’s ever changing claim lines in the Western Sector and the Tibetan perspective albeit he has quoted from Melvyn Goldstein’s works on Tibet.
While the book is clearly aimed at scholars of international relations and Asian history, its clarity and engaging style make it accessible to general readers. Chevrin uses maps, figures, photographs and primary source excerpts to enhance understanding, making complex geopolitical discussions easier to follow. His writing is authoritative yet approachable, striking a fine balance between academic rigor and narrative storytelling.
The Cold War in the Himalayas is a must-read for anyone interested in Asian history, India-China relations, international relations, or Cold War studies. Reed Chevrin’s ability to situate a regional conflict within a global framework provides a model for how historical scholarship can illuminate contemporary geopolitical tensions. This book not only deepens our understanding of the Sino-Indian border conflict but also offers valuable lessons about the enduring complexities of international diplomacy in a multipolar world.
* B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.