Recon, Design, Build, Seed, Copy, Amplify, Control, Effect: The Disinformation Kill Chain.
MUMBAI: In the sprawling digital landscape of modern India, an invisible war rages daily. It’s fought not with bullets or bombs, but with carefully crafted narratives, manipulated images, and armies of bots. As the world’s largest democracy navigates increasingly complex geopolitical waters, India has become ground zero for sophisticated disinformation campaigns designed to inflame tensions and undermine democratic institutions.
These aren’t random acts of misinformation but highly orchestrated, multi-phase operations that follow a strategic playbook. Analysis of recent campaigns reveals an eight-phase framework that malicious actors follow with alarming precision. This framework exposes not just how disinformation is created, but how it systematically exploits existing societal divisions to maximum effect.
China employs anti-India disinformation campaigns across multiple fronts, often through structured strategies involving bot networks, fake accounts, and state media amplification. Key examples include undermining India’s G-20 presidency by mocking its financial capability, portraying India as the aggressor during the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, criticizing India’s Covid-19 response to damage global health credibility, isolating India diplomatically in conflicts like the Canada row, discrediting India over the Dalai Lama issue, highlighting Manipur unrest for instability claims, asserting territorial control over Arunachal Pradesh with fake maps, discrediting India’s economic growth to deter investors, supporting Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, and spreading narratives about Indian military weaknesses. These campaigns often leverage amplified messaging across social platforms while suppressing counter-narratives, achieving varying degrees of success in shaping perception or eroding trust internationally.
Pakistan employs disinformation campaigns against India across various fronts, utilizing tactics like fake accounts, bots, cloned media outlets, and trending hashtags to amplify impact. For instance, they portray India as authoritarian by spreading videos of alleged farmer brutality, seed narratives in Pakistani forums, and discredit Indian clarifications. In Kashmir, fake atrocity photos and trends like #KashmirBleeds sustain anti-India sentiment globally. The Pulwama attack denial used bots and influencers to create doubt. Smears on the Rafale deal targeted India’s defence image via fake sites, while Islamophobia claims harmed Middle East ties through fabricated accounts. Balakot airstrike denial involved faked imagery to sow internal doubt. CAA protests were amplified with edited footage, and fake terror claims, while flippantly accusing India of sponsoring violence in Pakistan. Economic instability narratives used phony reports to deter investors. Military defeat propaganda during the 2019 conflict mocked India’s military through edited video and hashtags like #WingCommanderAbhinandan. These campaigns aim to exploit domestic issues, influence global perceptions, and undermine strategic credibility.
It is imperative to deconstruct and understand how these operations are conducted so that they can be identified and nipped in the bud. In fact, the perpetrators of such campaigns use a very scientific methodology, which is akin to military warfare protocols. This information warfare is conducted through something called a disinformation kill chain.
I will now explain how a Disinformation Kill Chain operates through the lifecycle of a single campaign.
RECON, DESIGN, BUILD, SEED, COPY, AMPLIFY, CONTROL, EFFECT
The first phase, dubbed “RECON,” involves identifying vulnerabilities within Indian society. Operators meticulously map fault lines across religious, regional, and socioeconomic divides. During the 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act protests, actors capitalized on Muslim communities’ fears of marginalization. Similarly, the 2020-21 farmers’ protests provided fertile ground to exploit rural-urban divides and agrarian distress.
Once vulnerabilities are identified, the “DESIGN” phase crafts narratives specifically engineered to provoke outrage. These narratives blend partial truths with falsehoods to create compelling, emotionally resonant stories. During the farmers’ protests, legitimate concerns about agricultural reforms were twisted into apocalyptic claims that the government planned to abolish minimum support prices entirely—despite explicit government denials.
The “BUILD” phase creates the infrastructure of deception. Investigations have uncovered networks of fake accounts, cloned news websites, and coordinated bot armies ready to deploy when needed. These assets often lie dormant until activated, making them difficult to detect preemptively. The sophistication has increased dramatically, with some accounts developing seemingly authentic online personas for months before suddenly pivoting to spread disinformation.
The “SEED” phase marks the quiet launch of campaigns, typically beginning in closed digital ecosystems like WhatsApp groups or Telegram channels. During the early days of Covid-19, fabricated statistics about India’s pandemic response first appeared in local community groups before seeping into mainstream platforms.
As campaigns gain traction, the “COPY” phase repurposes content across multiple formats. A single false claim might transform from text to memes, videos, and infographics, each designed for specific platforms. This cross-platform approach ensures maximum reach and complicates fact-checking efforts.
The “AMPLIFY” phase leverages both automated systems and unwitting human participants to boost visibility. During the farmers’ protests, international celebrities inadvertently amplified unverified claims while coordinated bot networks pushed hashtags to trend globally. These operations blur the line between organic and manufactured outrage. Once real people start sharing content, it becomes virtually impossible to contain.
To maintain momentum, the “CONTROL” phase works to discredit critics and create illusions of consensus. Fact-checkers face coordinated harassment, while fake “grassroots” movements create the appearance of widespread agreement with false narratives.
Finally, the “EFFECT” phase harvests real-world consequences. The tangible impacts range from street violence to policy reversals driven by manufactured public pressure. A 2024 study found that districts with higher exposure to targeted disinformation experienced significantly more protest activity and communal incidents.
One recent case study highlights this framework in action. During the 2023 border tensions, fabricated videos purportedly showing military movements went viral. The campaign began in obscure forums but quickly spread to mainstream social media. Within 72 hours, disturbances erupted in several cities, and diplomatic relations suffered. Subsequent investigation revealed a network of over 2,000 coordinated accounts operating from servers outside India.
The sources of these campaigns vary widely. While foreign
India has not remained passive in the face of these threats. The Digital India Media Literacy Initiative now reaches millions of students annually, teaching critical thinking skills for evaluating online content. Technological solutions show promise as well. AI-driven tools can now detect synthetic media with increasing accuracy, while digital watermarking helps authenticate genuine content. The government should constitute an Information Integrity Task Force which coordinates responses across agencies, ensuring that there is transparency in these efforts.
Legislative measures are also evolving. Introduced in February 2021, India’s Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules 2021) aim to regulate social media platforms, streaming services, and digital news outlets. The proposed Digital India Act (DIA) (likely) provides for penalties for organized disinformation, though implementation remains challenging in a borderless digital environment. Meanwhile, social media platforms have enhanced their detection capabilities, removing millions of inauthentic accounts annually. The act’s potential to regulate intermediaries and address misinformation could counter campaigns by actors like China and Pakistan, as discussed in prior analyses, but its success depends on robust implementation and public trust.
This is fundamentally a battle for truth. When citizens cannot distinguish fact from fiction, democracy itself is at risk. The challenges are particularly acute in India’s diverse linguistic landscape, where content moderation in regional languages often lags behind English. Rural and elderly populations remain especially vulnerable to targeted campaigns.
As India prepares for a complex future in which artificial intelligence will make fabricated content increasingly difficult to identify, the stakes could not be higher. The machinery of deception grows more sophisticated by the day, but so too do the tools and awareness needed to combat it.
The question remains whether India’s democratic institutions and civil society can evolve quickly enough to preserve the integrity of public discourse against this invisible yet potent threat. The answer may determine not just India’s future, but serve as a crucial test case for democracies worldwide facing similar challenges.
* Brijesh Singh is a senior IPS officer and an author, his latest book is “The Cloud Chariot” (Penguin). Views are personal.