The People’s Liberation Army’s struggle with joint warfare capabilities could become its Achilles’ heel in future conflicts, offering India a strategic edge.
Behind China’s rapidly expanding arsenal of stealth jets, warships, and cutting-edge missiles lies a quieter, more troubling reality: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) struggles with a fundamental military competency — jointness.
Joint warfare, the seamless integration of land, sea, air, and space forces, is essential for modern militaries operating in complex theatres of conflict. For all its technological prowess and swelling defence budgets, China’s armed forces have yet to master this critical component. And that could prove a vulnerability, especially in Asia’s evolving security landscape, where India — its largest neighbour and strategic competitor — has decades of experience in joint operations.
A Siloed Superpower in the Making
The PLA remains fragmented despite President Xi Jinping’s sweeping reforms aimed at building a “world-class military” by 2049. Its constituent arms — the Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and Rocket Force (PLARF) — operate with a striking lack of integration. While the PLA has undergone significant technological upgrades, its warfighting doctrine is hampered by an entrenched culture of interservice rivalry and operational silos.
Historically, China’s military strategy prioritised internal security, leaving limited room for joint operational thinking. Each service cultivated its own doctrines, operational cultures, and procurement priorities. This fragmented approach, experts argue, poses significant risks. “Without jointness, the PLA’s ability to project power and sustain operations beyond its immediate periphery is limited,” said a senior defence analyst familiar with China’s military modernisation efforts.
Bureaucracy Over Battlefield Readiness
Structural reforms have only partially addressed these issues. While the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) was intended to streamline operations, these institutions remain in the early stages of integration.
A major obstacle lies in the PLA’s command structure. The Central Military Commission (CMC) retains tight, centralised control over operational decisions. While this ensures political loyalty — a cornerstone of Xi’s leadership — it creates bottlenecks. Unit-level commanders lack the autonomy required for rapid tactical responses, especially during missions beyond the First Island Chain, an area encompassing Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
“The PLA’s over-centralisation leads to sluggish decision-making,” noted a Western military strategist. “It undermines the very agility required in modern conflict scenarios.”
Training Gaps and Leadership Deficits
If joint operations are the orchestra of modern warfare, the PLA lacks a conductor. Most PLA commanders have limited real-world experience in joint missions. The curriculum at the Joint Operations Academy under China’s National Defense University is reportedly in flux, undergoing rapid changes that have left instructors and students struggling to keep pace.
Even efforts to increase joint training exercises have fallen short. While China has conducted some high-profile drills, these remain infrequent and largely symbolic. By contrast, India’s military conducts complex joint exercises regularly, both domestically and with international partners such as the United States, France, Russia, Australia, and several Southeast Asian nations.
India’s growing proficiency in joint operations is not accidental. Since 2002, it has systematically expanded the scope and complexity of its combined exercises. Recent operations, particularly along its northern borders, have highlighted the Indian military’s ability to integrate air, land, and sea forces in real-time.
Technological Gaps in Communication and Coordination
Even China’s technological edge does not guarantee jointness. A lack of standardised equipment across services hampers interoperability. Communication systems that cannot seamlessly link air, sea, and land operations undermine the PLA’s operational cohesion.
“The PLA may have advanced platforms, but without integrated command and control, they cannot achieve the synergy needed in joint operations,” said a South Asian security expert.
Furthermore, ongoing procurement efforts have not focused sufficiently on creating shared technological baselines. This leaves gaps in battlefield awareness and complicates the alignment of strategic objectives between services.
Political Priorities Trump Operational Efficiency
The roots of these challenges extend beyond military doctrine. The PLA’s leadership structure is deeply politicised. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on ensuring absolute loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party means that senior appointments often prioritise political reliability over operational competence.
This focus on loyalty comes at a cost. Interservice rivalries fester unchecked, with each branch competing for resources and influence. As long as political loyalty trumps battlefield performance, operational integration will remain elusive.
“China’s military ambitions are undermined by a leadership crisis,” explained a military historian. “The top brass is more concerned with political survival than with fostering joint operational capability.”
Opportunities for India in a Fractured PLA
India’s experience in joint warfare, coupled with China’s ongoing struggles, presents strategic opportunities. Analysts believe that India could leverage its superior operational integration to offset China’s numerical and technological advantages.
In scenarios involving multi-domain operations — such as high-altitude warfare along disputed Himalayan borders or maritime confrontations in the Indian Ocean — India’s ability to synchronise air, land, and naval forces could provide a decisive edge.
“The PLA’s inability to conduct joint operations gives India a window of opportunity,” said a former Indian naval officer. “In conflict, coordinated responses are key. India’s integrated approach could outmanoeuvre a fragmented Chinese force.”
The Road Ahead for China’s Military Reforms
While Xi Jinping’s ambition of achieving a world-class military by 2049 remains the guiding star of China’s defence strategy, the path is strewn with institutional challenges. Realising true jointness requires not just structural reforms but cultural transformation — a process that may take decades.
China’s recent military white papers emphasise joint warfare capabilities, yet the slow pace of meaningful reform suggests deep-rooted inertia. For Beijing, overcoming these hurdles will be essential to asserting its strategic ambitions, particularly as it faces potential flashpoints in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.
Until then, the PLA’s lack of jointness remains a latent vulnerability — one that India and other regional players will no doubt keep a close eye on.